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INTRODUCTION 
Few constitutional rules are absolute. Even the most emphatic 
prohibitions typically are restricted in scope or riddled with exceptions. 
The Establishment Clause decrees that government may "make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion," yet permits governments to dis-
play overtly religious symbols in public squares.' The Free Speech 
Clause squarely forbids abridgment of the freedom of speech, yet permits 
official suppression of speech that incites lawlessness, 2 provokes retalia-
* Vice Dean for Academic Affairs and Joseph W. Belluck and Laura L. Aswad Profes-
sor of Civil Justice, University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New York. Thanks 
to Lise Gelernter, Michael Halberstam, Rick Hasen, and George Kannar for valuable com-
ments on an earlier draft, and to Lynn King for outstanding research assistance. 
I See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-87 (1984). 
2 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
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tion,3 or disturbs private peace and tranquility.4 The Takings Clause de-
crees that private property shall not be taken without just compensation, 
yet such property may be subjected to regulatory burdens that substan-
tially lower its economic value without triggering the compensation re-
quirement.5 No doubt even the newly recognized personal right to bear 
arms6 soon will be found subject to numerous restrictions and 
limitations. 
Yet there is one corner of constitutional law where "no" means 
"no." In the field of campaign speech, and in the closely allied area of 
campaign spending, the Supreme Court has construed the Constitution to 
permit essentially no government regulation at all. For more than thirty 
years, the Court has aggressively defended a constitutional policy creat-
ing a zone of virtually complete freedom from government-imposed lim-
itations of either speech or spending undertaken with the aim of 
influencing elections. In Citizens United v. FEC,7 decided last term, the 
Court went even further, revoking one of the very few forms of govern-
ment authority to regulate campaign spending that the Court had previ-
ously held permissible. Thus, during the very period when the Court has 
steadily expanded loopholes and workarounds to permit government reg-
ulation in other areas of seemingly strict constitutional prohibition, it has 
moved to tighten a constitutional regime of already unparalleled 
stringency. 
A great deal has been written about the Court's jurisprudence of 
campaign spending, much of it critical.8 Not unexpectedly, the Court's 
decision in Citizens United was subjected immediately to severe criti-
cism from regulators, academics, journalists, and citizens.9 Many politi-
3 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
4 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-86 (1949).
5 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133-38 (1978). 
6 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591-95 (2008); McDonald v. Chi-
cago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3022-24 (2010).
7 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
8 See, e.g., FRANK J. SORAUF, MONEY INAMERICAN ELECrIONS (1988); Vincent Blasi, 
Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why CampaignSpending Limits May 
Not Violate the FirstAmendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1994); David A. Strauss, 
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV.1369 (1994); J. 
Skelly Wright, Politicsand the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). 
9 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKs, May 13, 2010, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/ 
decision-threatens-democracy; Editorial, The Court's Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
22, 2010, at A30; Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers: The Supreme Court Kills Campaign 
Finance Reform, SLATE, (Jan. 21, 2010, 12:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2242209; Timm 
Herdt, High Court Embraces the Worst of State Politics,VCSTAR.COM (Jan. 26, 2010, 6:29 
PM), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2010/jan/26/high-court-embraces-the-worst-of-state-polit-
ics; David Kairys, Money Isn't Speech and CorporationsAren't People: The Misguided Theo-
ries Behind the Supreme Court'sRuling on CampaignFinanceReform, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2010, 
6:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2242210; Lawrence H. Tribe, What Should CongressDo 
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cians enthusiastically joined in, all the way up to the President of the 
United States, who expressly rebuked the Supreme Court during his State 
of the Union Address.10 
So much has been written criticizing the Court's campaign finance 
jurisprudence generally, and its decision in Citizens United specifically, 
that there is little point in piling on. Instead, what I propose to do here is 
to examine an aspect of the Court's approach to campaign finance regu-
lation that has not gotten a great deal of attention, something that might 
be termed the Court's "positioning" in this area of law. The range of 
potential judicial reactions to government regulation in areas of constitu-
tionally protected individual right might be conceived as lying along a 
spectrum. At one end lies more or less complete opposition to regulatory 
intervention. At the other end lies more or less complete acceptance of 
regulatory action. In between lie a great many possible centrist positions 
in which some but not all regulation is approached with some but not 
complete skepticism. In this territory, some forms of regulation, or some 
topics of regulatory interest, or some degree of regulatory intrusion, 
might be permissible while others are not. 
What is striking about the Court's approach in campaign spending 
cases is that it has staked out the most extreme position available to it by 
adopting a kind of anti-regulatory absolutism that bars any and all regu-
lation-not just presumptively, as is common in the case of many indi-
vidual rights," but in actual practice. This raises an interesting question, 
not so much about the specific shape of legal doctrine, but about the 
Court's general approach to this particular field of constitutional law. It 
is strict and rigid. It eschews nuance. It is highly unusual in the annals 
of constitutional law. The question I propose to explore here is: Why 
this approach? Why not something even a little bit more moderate? On 
what set of assumptions might it seem appropriate to the Court to permit 
not even the slightest legislative restriction of campaign spending? 
About Citizens United?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 24, 2010, 10:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog. 
com/2010/01/what-should-congress-do-about-citizens-united; The Daily Show: Supreme Corp 
(COMEDY CENTRAL television broadcast Jan. 25, 2010), availableat http://www.thedailyshow. 
com/watch/mon-January-25-2010/supreme-corp. 
10 Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http:// 
abcnews.go.com/Politics/State-of-theUnion/state-of-the-union-2010-president-obama-
speech-transcript/story?id=9678572. 
11 That is to say, the effect of applying strict scrutiny-the most rights-protective stan-
dard available for application to laws that infringe constitutionally protected individual liber-
ties-is to create a very strong, though in principle not insurmountable, presumption against 
the constitutionality of such laws. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact:An 
EmpiricalAnalysis of Strict Scrutiny in the FederalCourts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 815 (2006) 
(demonstrating empirically that strictly scrutinized laws survive review in some thirty percent 
of all cases). What is distinctive about the Court's use of strict scrutiny in the campaign arena 
is that the presumption it erects seems, in this field of constitutional law, all but irrebuttable. 
676 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:673 
I argue that the Court's behavior is consistent with-and is best 
understood as-the kind of behavior in which a court engages when it 
fears a slide down a slippery slope. In these circumstances, a court typi-
cally believes that the law so completely reviles some particular state of 
affairs that the court's job is not only to prevent the attainment of that 
precise state of affairs, but also to prevent any and all actions that might 
subsequently turn out to facilitate movement toward the disfavored 
outcome. 
To the extent that the Supreme Court's anti-regulatory absolutism in 
the campaign spending arena results from its fear of facilitating-or pre-
cipitating-a slide down a dangerous slippery slope, then two useful 
questions, routine in any examination of the logic of slippery slopism, 
become pertinent. First, what is at the bottom of the slope? What is it, 
exactly, that the Court so thoroughly fears? Second, how reasonable is 
the belief that any movement at all down the slope will result in an irre-
versible slide directly into the feared ultimate outcome? 
The balance of this Article is organized as follows. Part I offers a 
very brief review of the Court's treatment of restrictions on campaign 
speech and spending, showing the trend toward anti-regulatory absolu-
tism. Part II makes the case for viewing the Court's stance as reflecting 
an underlying fear of a slippery slope. Part III attempts to identify the 
monster at the bottom of the slope. This is more difficult than it seems 
because the Court has been extremely vague about what exactly is 
threatened by government regulation of campaign speech and spending. 
I explore several possible formulations of the relevant danger and con-
clude that all of them involve to some degree a fear of the loss of demo-
cratic self-rule, especially a fear that incumbents will use government 
power to entrench themselves in office, resulting in a catastrophic and 
possibly irremediable loss of popular sovereignty. 
Finally, Part IV scrutinizes the absolutist position more closely by 
examining several possible mechanisms by which regulation might lead 
down the slippery slope to political slavery. Because slippery slope ar-
guments nearly always rest on speculative empirical premises, they 
rarely can be rebutted in any formal sense. Nevertheless, slippery slope 
arguments can be more or less plausible, and I argue ultimately that none 
of the possible relevant formulations is sufficiently plausible to justify 
the Court's absolutist stance against regulation of campaign spending. 
I. THE RISE OF ANTI-REGULATORY ABSOLUTISM 
For much of American history, government regulation of the electo-
ral process concerned itself mainly with two tasks: determining who is 
eligible to vote, and enacting administrative rules governing the casting 
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and counting of ballots. 12 Campaigns themselves were completely un-
regulated.13 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
states and the federal government began to take a regulatory interest in 
the campaign phase of the electoral process. Initially, these laws aimed 
at imposing modest limits on the role of money in politics, mainly by 
restricting the ability of corporations to contribute money to candidates 
for office. 14 By the mid-twentieth century, many states had enacted 
much more far-reaching fair-campaign codes that attempted to elevate 
the tone and tactics of campaigns by requiring candidates to adhere to 
ethical rules of honesty and fair behavior in their campaign statements 
and actions.15 
When cases challenging the constitutionality of government regula-
tion of campaign activities began to reach the Court, its initial reaction 
was pragmatic and, consistent with its post-Lochner approach to consti-
tutional constraints on government regulatory authority, largely deferen-
tial to exercises of governmental power. In a significant ruling in United 
Public Workers v. Mitchell,'6 the Court upheld federal civil service rules 
that severely restricted participation in political campaigns by federal 
workers. In United States v. CIO,17 the Court deflected a constitutional 
challenge to a federal prohibition on union participation in political cam-
paigns by giving a narrow construction to the challenged statute. Later, 
in United States v. UA W,18 the Court apparently felt sufficiently confi-
dent about the constitutionality of government limitations on corporate 
and union campaign expenditures to interpret a provision of the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act broadly enough to permit criminal prosecution of a 
union official for using union funds to purchase political television ad-
vertisements. In the course of its opinion, the Court gave a lengthy and 
sympathetic account of the history of congressional efforts to "purge na-
tional politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of 
'big money' campaign contributions."' 9 
12 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOC-
RACY IN THE UNITED STATES 28-33, 127-29 (2000). 
13 Even the election phase was unregulated often to the point of near-chaos. See gener-
ally RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT Box IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CEN-
TURY (2004). 
14 See, e.g., Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended 
at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (2006)) (prohibiting campaign contributions by corporations). 
15 See James A. Albert, The Remedies Available to Candidates Who Are Defamed by 
Television or Radio Commercials or Opponents, 11 VT. L. REv 33, 57-59 (1986); Terri R. 
Day, "Nasty as They Wanna Be" Politics: Campaigningand the FirstAmendment, 35 OHIO 
N.U. L. REv. 647, 658-60 (2009); Developments in the Law-Election Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 
1111, 1233-98 (1975). 
16 330 U.S. 75, 103 (1947). 
17 335 U.S. 106, 120-24 (1948). 
18 352 U.S. 567, 590-93 (1957). 
19 Id. at 572. 
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Within a decade, however, the Court's approach to government re-
strictions on campaign speech and finance changed dramatically. The 
present era was ushered in by the Court's 1964 decision in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, a case in which the Court took a sharply critical 
view of content-based limitations on speech of a political cast.2 0 Holding 
that the First Amendment decreed a regime of politics in which debate is 
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 21 the Court held that a state could 
not constitutionally punish speech criticizing a public official not only if 
the criticism were true, but even if it were false so long as the falsity was 
negligent rather than deliberate or reckless. 22 
Although Sullivan did not itself apply to speech made during a cam-
paign, its holding established an extremely strong default rule against 
government restriction of speech with a political valence, and the Court 
almost immediately proceeded to extend the Sullivan approach to laws 
purporting to regulate what candidates for elective office, voters, and 
other political actors might say or do during the formal campaign phase 
of the electoral process. In Mills v. Alabama,23 for example, the Court 
struck down a state law prohibiting newspapers from publishing editorial 
endorsements on election day, a law that had been enacted for the pur-
pose of ensuring candidates some ability to reply effectively to last-min-
ute false or misleading statements by their opponents. 24 In 1971, the 
Court decided Monitor PatriotCo. v. Roy,25 in which it explicitly ex-
tended Sullivan'sprotection for criticism of sitting public officials to crit-
icism of candidates for office. 2 6 In 1974, the Court decided in Miami 
Heraldv. Tornillo2 7 that newspapers could not be forced by law to pro-
vide candidates space in which to reply to critical speech appearing in the 
28newspaper. 
The Court's hostility toward regulation of campaign behavior inten-
sified in its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo,29 when it expanded its 
approach to embrace not only campaign speech, but campaign finance, 
which it treated as constitutionally equivalent to campaign speech.30 In 
20 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (invalidating a state libel law as applied to a newspaper that 
published a politically tinged advertisement criticizing a local public official). 
21 Id. at 270. 
22 Id. at 283-88. 
23 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
24 See id. at 218-20. 
25 401 U.S. 265 (1971). 
26 See id. at 277. 
27 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
28 See id. at , 257-58. The Court did reach a more pragmatic result in Red Lion Broad-
casting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), which upheld a federal regulation imposing such a right 
of reply on television broadcasters. The Court's reasoning relied heavily on its view of the 
broadcast spectrum as a scarce public resource. Id. at 389-90. 
29 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
30 See id. at 45-59. 
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Buckley, the Court invalidated key portions of a comprehensive federal 
law intended to limit the spending of money during campaigns for fed-
eral office.31 Although the Court upheld limitations on direct contribu-
tions to candidates by individuals and organizations, it invalidated as 
"wholly foreign to the First Amendment" restrictions on how much 
money individuals, groups, and candidates could spend on speech for or 
against candidates or on the discussion of issues relevant to the 
campaign.32 
Buckley went much further than prior cases toward construing the 
Constitution to require that campaigns for political office be conducted 
virtually free from government control, and its impact has been substan-
tial. In the more than thirty years since it decided Buckley, the Court has 
gone on to invalidate virtually every restriction on campaign speech or 
spending that has come before it. It has, for example, struck down laws 
prohibiting corporate expenditures33 and individual contributions34 in 
connection with referendum measures, limiting independent spending in 
favor of presidential candidates who opt to receive federal matching 
funds,35 requiring certain non-profit advocacy organizations to pay for 
political spending out of a dedicated political fund,36 banning editorializ-
ing by public broadcast stations receiving federal funds, 37 prohibiting 
anonymous campaign speech,38 proscribing certain corporate expendi-
tures on issue advertisements, 39 and relaxing contribution limitations for 
opponents of wealthy candidates who finance their own campaigns. 40 
Over the course of more than three decades there have been, to be 
sure, a few small, pragmatic deviations from this general trend. For ex-
ample, the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce41 upheld 
a state law prohibiting corporations from making independent campaign 
4 3expenditures out of general treasury funds, 42 and in McConnell v. FEC 
it rejected facial challenges to provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act (BCRA) prohibiting parties and candidates for federal office 
from spending on electoral activities funds that had been raised by the 
parties for other purposes, and prohibiting corporations and unions from 
31 See id. at 50. 
32 Id. at 49. 
33 See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
34 See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981). 
35 See FEC v. Nat'1 Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
36 See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
37 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
38 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1994). 
39 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
40 See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
41 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
42 See id. at 666. 
43 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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spending money out of general treasury funds on political advertisements 
during a sixty-day period preceding the general election.4 
These deviations proved ephemeral. Soon after its ruling in Mc-
Connell, the Court watered down its holding on corporate and union 
spending by approving an as-applied challenge to the very provision of 
BCRA it had recently upheld. 45 In its most recent decision, Citizens 
United, the Court reversed key aspects of its decisions in McConnell and 
Austin, thereby depriving governments of any authority to limit cam-
paign spending by corporations and unions. After this decision, no gov-
ernment-imposed limitations on campaign spending whatsoever are 
constitutional whether applied to individuals, groups, candidates, corpo-
rations, or any other kind of organization. 
Lower federal courts have clearly understood the Supreme Court's 
campaign jurisprudence to erect a virtually absolute prohibition on gov-
ernment regulation, and in consequence have routinely invalidated all 
manner of regulations limiting campaign speech and spending, regardless 
of the proffered justification. For example, lower courts have invalidated 
state laws prohibiting false or misleading speech during campaigns;46 au-
thorizing a state elections board to censure a candidate for using negative 
campaigning tactics;47 limiting the release of exit poll data while voting 
is still ongoing; 48 requiring newspapers to charge affordable rates to can-
didates for office placing campaign advertisements; 49 and prohibiting 
contributions to candidates by government contractors50 and lobbyists.5 ' 
In sum, then, the Supreme Court has adopted and for more than 
three decades has maintained a jurisprudence of campaign speech and 
spending so strict as to preclude virtually any government regulation at 
44 See id. at 178. The Court has, however, followed Buckley's somewhat more deferen-
tial approach to regulation of campaign contributions, and it has generally continued to uphold 
reasonable restrictions on contributions as adequately justified by the risk of quid pro quo 
corruption. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 
U.S. 377 (2000) (both upholding limitations on campaign contributions). 
45 See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 456. 
46 See, e.g., Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991); Vanasco 
v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 168 P.3d 
826 (Wash. 2007). For a general discussion, see William P. Marshall, FalseCampaignSpeech 
and the FirstAmendment, 153 U. PA. L. Rav. 285 (2004). 
47 See Ancheta v. Watada, 135 F. Supp. 26 1114 (D. Haw. 2001). 
48 See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988). 
49 Gore Newspapers Co. v. Shevin, 397 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 
1057 (5th Cir. 1977). 
50 Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010). 
51 Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 
1183 (E.D. Cal. 2001); Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46 (Cal. 
1979). 
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all, and its commitment to an absolutist stance has noticeably increased 
as the approach of the Roberts Court has begun to emerge and solidify. 52 
II. ABSOLUTISM AND THE FEAR OF SLIPPERY SLOPES 
The Court's absolutist stance would be easy enough to understand if 
there were simply no good justification whatsoever for regulating cam-
paign spending in even the slightest degree. Yet the public has long sup-
ported restrictions on campaign spending-recent polls show that 
between about 55 and 80 percent disapproved of the Court's ruling in 
Citizens United53-and over the years advocates of regulation have ad-
vanced numerous, and in many cases powerful, justifications for permit-
ting some sort of government intervention in what would otherwise be a 
laissez-faire campaign arena. 
Regulation of campaign spending initially was justified at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century by a naked fear of corporate dominance of 
politics. The ability of corporations to accumulate immense wealth, re-
formers believed, permitted large corporations to bribe or otherwise con-
trol candidates for office, and through political spending to orchestrate 
electoral results, thereby undermining the proper operation of democratic 
54 processes. By the time Congress enacted the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act in 1971, the panoply of justifications had grown. The cor-
rupting potential of large donations, whether from corporations or rich 
individuals, still was a source of great concern,55 as was the ability of 
52 It has been suggested to me by more than one person that my description of the 
Court's position as absolutist is undermined to some degree by its approval of disclosure as an 
alternative to suppression. I cannot agree. First, the burden of regulatory disclosure regimes 
falls mainly on contributions, not expenditures, and the Court has been a good deal more 
generous toward contribution restrictions. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-26 (1976). Sec-
ond, to the extent the Court has addressed disclosure of expenditures, it has been distinctly 
hostile. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1994). Finally, even if the Court 
were to embrace disclosure of campaign spending as a second-best alternative to direct restric-
tions, any burden on spending that disclosure might impose cannot be compared to the burden 
of outright limitation. Consequently, I think it is entirely fair to call the Court's position 
regarding limitation of campaign speech and spending "absolutist"-especially in comparison 
to its approach to other constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
53 Poll results cited in Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 
109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 620 n.258 (2011). 
54 The conventional story is compactly told in Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court 
in United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). Recently, Winkler has shown that another 
concern also played a very important role-Winkler claims the dominant role-in justifying 
regulatory reform: the belief that corporate resources belong to shareholders, and that using 
them for non-economic purposes constitutes an abuse of a relationship of trust. Adam Win-
kler, "Other People'sMoney": Corporations,Agency Costs, and Campaign FinanceLaw, 92 
GEO. L.J. 871 (2004) [hereinafter Winkler, Other People's Money]. 
55 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; Richard L. Hasen, The Nine Lives of Buckley v. Valeo, in 
FIRST AMENDMENT STORIEs (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2010), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1593253. 
682 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:673 
wealthy candidates-or those with wealthy supporters-to "buy" office 
by outspending rivals of more modest means.56 But other concerns were 
raised as well. Legislators worried that the escalating cost of campaigns 
required incumbent office holders to devote inordinate amounts of time 
to fundraising, impeding their ability to do the job for which they were 
elected, to the detriment of the public good.57 The increasing cost of 
campaigns also was thought to create a kind of arms race that drove 
candidates to make ever greater use of means and tactics of mass com-
munication that were of questionable utility to sound democratic deliber-
ation, thereby lowering the quality of democratic discourse.58 The sheer 
56 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, at 3 (1974) ("Under the present law the impression 
persists that a candidate can buy an election by simply spending large sums in a campaign."); 
120 CONG. REc. 7,897 (1974) (statement of Rep. Biaggi) ("this amendment would encourage 
more States to join these five thus again restricting the ability of a candidate to buy his way 
into public office"); id. at 7,936 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("one of the primary pur-
poses of this bill . . . is to limit the ability of any candidate to literally buy an election"); 117 
CONG. REc. 26,111 (1971) (statement of Sen. Prouty) ("a candidate should not be able to buy 
off any election in his behalf. Men and women elected to Federal office must be elected and 
chosen by their constituency and not by themselves"); id. at 29,299 (statement of Sen. Chiles) 
("I do not believe the American way is that we should be able to buy an office"); id. at 29,321 
(statement of Sen. Muskie) ("media spending should be limited so that no candidate can over-
whelm his opponent or the electorate with an advertising campaign of monumental cost, and, 
in effect, buy his way into office . . . . It is a waste of resources and a distortion of the 
democratic process."); id. at 29,323 (statement of Sen. Symington) ("Reasonable limitations 
must be applied to the expenditures of a candidate so as to prevent any person with unlimited 
resources from 'buying' an election"). 
57 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91; see also Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening 
Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why CampaignSpending Limits May Not Violate the FirstAmendment 
After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1994); David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign 
FinanceReform?, 1995 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 141, 155-58. In Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 
249 (2006), Vermont assembled a significant factual record supporting its contention that can-
didates spend a substantial and unhealthy amount of time raising funds, although the Supreme 
Court ultimately rejected this as a sufficient justification for limiting campaign expenditures. 
See Brief of Respondents at 16, Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (Nos. 04-1528, 04-
1530, 04-1697), 2004 U.S. Briefs 1528 at *16-*20. 
58 See, e.g., 117 CONG. REc. 29,005 (1971) (statement of Sen. Brooke) ("[the proposed 
measure] would . . . logically bring about a second highly desirable goal-a reduction in 
spending for media advertising and in the superficial commercialization of candidates that has 
become much too familiar in American political life"); id. at 29,317 (statement of Sen. Hartke) 
("In recent years, the promotion of this superficial imagery has been accentuated by candidates 
of both major parties throughout the Nation. At times it is harmless, but all too often it can be 
diabolical. Using advertising techniques developed by publicists of detergents, deodorants and 
automobiles, political candidates have used 30-second and 1-minute advertisements on radio 
and television to misrepresent facts and create false and baseless impressions about their oppo-
nents.... No 30-second commercial ever was able to explain how brand X eliminates grease 
and dirt, and no 30-second commercial will ever be able to allow a political candidate to 
engage in a rational discussion of a single issue. . . . Today, Americans are rejecting the 
politics of superficiality. They demand far more than clich6s and invective. What they long 
for is an honest and frank discussion of the issues which concern them and their country."). 
To very similar effect, see id. at 26,943 (statement of Sen. Stevenson), id. at 28,819 (material 
introduced by Sen. Cotton), id. at 29,320 (statement of Sen. Humphrey), id. at 29,322 (state-
ment of Sen. Talmadge). The debates contain many other, similar comments. Concern over 
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cost of mounting an effective campaign was understood simply to pre-
clude many highly qualified and talented individuals from running for 
office, a loss to the public and, in many cases, to the representativeness 
of legislatures. 59 
Since the Court's decision in Buckley gutting FECA, critics of the 
Court's approach have developed a host of additional reasons why the 
Constitution should not be understood to erect an absolute barrier to gov-
ernment regulation of campaign spending. Money, it has been argued, is 
not speech, and regulating its use should therefore not be evaluated in the 
same way as the direct regulation of speech.60 Special interests may 
bribe candidates just as easily through large expenditures on their behalf 
as through large contributions to their war chests. 61 Foundational princi-
ples of democratic equality entail a commitment to equality of opportu-
nity to influence politics, a commitment that is subverted when political 
influence is distributed according to the accident of wealth. 62 Minimiz-
ing the degree to which economic disparities are ramified in politics will 
increase and broaden political participation in a democratically desirable 
way.6 3 The electoral arena is a specialized area of such unique and im-
the use by politicians of techniques of commercial advertising did not arise suddenly in 1971; 
critics of campaign practices had been making similar complaints since at least the 1920s, with 
the rise of the so-called "merchandising" or "advertising" campaign. See, e.g., RICHARD JEN-
SEN, THE WINNING OF THE MIDWEST: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT, 1888-1896, 154-77 
(1971); see also ROBERT J. DINKIN, CAMPAIGNING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF ELECTION 
PRACTICES, 127-57 (1989); MICHAEL E. McGERR, THE DECLINE OF POPULAR POLITICS: THE 
AMERICAN NORTH, 1865-1928, 138-83 (1986). 
59 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-96, at 22 (1971) ("The crisis level has been reached in Amer-
ican campaign spending.... [According to] author John Wale: 'there is a danger that the cost 
of campaigning, chiefly swollen by the cost of television, will exclude the honest poor"'); id. 
at 77 (1971) (Supplemental Views of Mr. Hart) (the legislative goal must be "to place public 
office. . . within the reach of not the rich alone"); 117 CONG. REC. 26,111 (1971) (statement of 
Sen. Prouty) ("If our Government is to represent all of American and its diversified economic 
interests, we must assure that not only the rich have an opportunity to serve"); id. at 29,297-98 
(statement of Sen. Mathias) ("[W]e are saying that we are going to give men equal access, to 
the greatest extent possible, to the privilege and to the responsibility of public office."). 
60 See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Politics andthe Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE 
L.J. 1001 (1976); Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn'tSpeech, 95 MINN. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=15 86377. 
61 Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem ... and the Buckley Problem,73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 949, 990-93 (2005). 
62 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990); Richard Brif-
fault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563 (1999); Joel L. 
Fleishman, Public Financingof Election Campaigns:ConstitutionalConstraintson Steps To-
ward Equalityof PoliticalInfluence of Citizens,52 N.C. L. REV. 349 (1973); David A. Strauss, 
Corruption,Equality, andCampaignFinanceReform, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1369 (1994); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, PoliticalMoney and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 671 
(1997). 
63 John M. De Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett,Payingfor Politics,78 S. CALIF. L. REV. 
591, 627-34 (2005); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Cam-
paign FinanceIncoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
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mense concern to a democratic public that it must be understood to be 
susceptible to regulation for the public good." 
There is nothing in the case law or in the public and academic writ-
ing of supporters of the Court's strict approach to suggest that opponents 
of government regulation deny outright the validity of each and every 
one of these potential justifications for regulatory intervention. Nobody 
argues, for example, that the public is in fact better off when elected 
officials spend large amounts of time raising money instead of attending 
to the public's business. No one denies that our politics would be fairer 
and more inclusive if all citizens had access to financial resources suffi-
cient to promote their political views to an extent commensurate with 
their desire to do so. Nobody has attempted to advance a theory of polit-
ics purporting to demonstrate that campaign discourse ought to be domi-
nated by corporations or wealthy individuals. Rather, opponents of 
campaign regulation-including, most notably, the Supreme Court-rest 
their opposition on a different ground: that the Constitution cannot be 
understood to permit these problems to be addressed through regulatory 
intervention in the campaign process; that attempting to improve the 
quality of campaigns through government intervention would be-or at 
least could be-a cure worse than the disease.65 
Given the profound depths of public dissatisfaction with contempo-
rary politics, 6 6 and the consequent potentially great benefits that might 
accrue from a regulatory remedy, it is logical to ask what could possibly 
31 (2004); Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance,Democracy, and Partici-
pation, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 73 (2004). 
64 See, e.g., DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PRO-
CESS INTHE UNITED STATES 115 (2002) ("[E]1ections and the campaigns leading up to them 
may be considered more a part of government than a part of politics that influences govern-
ment. The standards that control the conduct of elections should therefore be determined more 
by collective decision than by individual choice."). To similar effect, see Dennis F. Thomp-
son, Election Time: Normative Implicationsof Temporal Propertiesofthe ElectoralProcessin 
the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 51 (2004); Saul Zipkin, The Election Period and 
Regulation of the DemocraticProcess, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 533 (2010). 
65 This is precisely the language adopted, for example, by Kathleen Sullivan, a relatively 
moderate-though firm and consistent-opponent of spending regulation. See Sullivan, supra 
note 62, at 687. Elsewhere, Sullivan concedes that corruption and maldistribution of political 
influence are evils, but that their "assessment ... is one best made by voters as a political 
question." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 
311, 329. Even such an implacable foe of campaign finance reform as Lillian BeVier readily 
conceded that achievement of a "broadly participatory" political discourse is a desirable goal, 
though she thought it could be brought about only through the unrestricted play of market 
forces. Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, IntractableDi-
lemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (1994). 
66 See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, WHAT ARE CAMPAIGNS FOR?: THE ROLE OF PERSUA-
SION IN ELECTORAL LAW AND PoLIrrCS 1-2, 40-43 (2009); JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH 
THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY: PUBLIC ATrITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN POLITI-
CAL INSTITUTIONS (1996); JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOC-
RACY: AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK (2002). 
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lead the Court and its supporters to calculate the costs and benefits of 
government regulation as they do. It bears repeating that the Court and 
its strongest supporters do not conclude merely that some campaign reg-
ulation is a bad idea, or that most of it is, or that regulation might be 
tolerated up to some threshold before it becomes unwise. To the con-
trary, they take the position that no regulation of campaign spending may 
be permitted; any regulation, no matter how trivial, is therefore to be 
opposed as a matter of policy and invalidated as a matter of constitu-
tional law. 
This is as extreme a position as it is possible for opponents of regu-
lation to take. What can account for it? Unfortunately, in today's po-
larized political climate, and following the Court's disgraceful decision 
in Bush v. Gore,6 7 it is impossible to rule out a cheap, partisan explana-
tion: Republicans and other conservatives feel they will do better in a 
campaign arena that is completely unregulated, or even chaotic and dis-
orderly-a conclusion that may be well-founded. 6 8 However, even if 
some present-day defenders of a laissez-faire political marketplace might 
be motivated by a kind of base partisanship, this was not always the case. 
Liberal stalwarts such as Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall regu-
larly joined the Court's rulings invalidating government intervention in 
political campaigns,69 and to this day the American Civil Liberties Union 
continues to oppose government restriction of campaign speech and 
spending despite the fact that it seems to disadvantage the kinds of inter-
ests that the ACLU more commonly works to advance. 70 Opposition to 
67 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
68 The conventional wisdom is that Republicans have a fundraising advantage over Dem-
ocrats mainly because their support tends to be drawn more heavily from socioeconomically 
better-off segments of the population, ANDREw GELMAN ET AL., RED STATE, BLUE STATE, 
RICH STATE, POOR STATE: WHY AMERICANS VOTE THE WAY THEY Do (2008), although the 
2008 Obama campaign showed that Democrats might be able to hold their own in a deregu-
lated campaign arena. See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, The New Role of the Small Donor in 
PoliticalCampaignsand the Demise of Public Funding, 25 J. L. & POL. 257 (2009) (describ-
ing fundraising strategies during the 2008 presidential campaign). It is worth pointing out that 
conservatives often combine opposition to government regulation of campaigns with opposi-
tion to public financing of campaigns-the constitutionality of which is not in doubt, Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-108 (1976)-suggesting that they simply prefer a laissez-faire politi-
cal marketplace. 
69 There is evidence that Brennan and Marshall may not always have done so with the 
greatest enthusiasm. See generally Richard L. Hasen, The Untold DraftingHistory of Buckley 
v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION L.J. 241 (2003) (describing Brennan's initial inclination to join Justice 
White's opinion voting to uphold expenditure limitations, and noting Marshall's vote in Buck-
ley to uphold limitations on expenditures from personal wealth). Nevertheless, Brennan dis-
sented in only one of the Court's subsequent major rulings invalidating spending restrictions 
(Belotti), and Marshall dissented only twice (Belotti and NCPAC). 
70 The ACLU has long opposed any and all restrictions on campaign spending. It very 
recently altered a forty-year policy of complete opposition to restrictions on campaign contri-
butions. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Board Addresses Campaign Finance Policy (Apr. 19, 
2010), http://www.aclu.org/free-speechlaclu-board-addresses-campaign-finance-policy. 
686 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:673 
government regulation of campaign speech and spending-even absolute 
opposition-therefore cannot simply be dismissed as the unprincipled 
pursuit of partisan advantage. 
What, then, might explain the absolutist position? The most reason-
able answer, it seems to me, is that anti-regulatory absolutism responds 
to a kind of fear that is not uncommon in the law: the fear of sliding 
down a slippery slope. No one, I think it is fair to say, maintains, or can 
plausibly maintain, that each and every instance of campaign speech, and 
each and every dollar of campaign spending, is intrinsically so valuable 
that democracy cannot survive without it. The most plausible account of 
anti-regulatory absolutism is therefore that it results from the belief that 
some kind of utterly clear line must be defended against even the slight-
est hint of erosion. This is the characteristic claim of the slippery slope 
argument.71 
But what lies at the bottom of the slope that anti-regulatory absolut-
ists so deeply fear? And on what grounds do they fear that one step 
might indeed lead to another and another until their worst fears are 
realized? 
III. SLIPPERY SLOPISM AND THE REGULATION OF CAMPAIGNS 
A. Slippery Slopes in ConstitutionalLaw 
A slippery slope argument, in its commonplace formulation, is the 
claim that "a particular act, seemingly innocuous when taken in isolation, 
may yet lead to a future host of similar but increasingly pernicious 
events." 72 One who advances such an argument claims, in essence, that 
"decision A, which you might find appealing, ends up materially increas-
ing the probability that others will bring about decision B, which you 
oppose."73 A slippery slope argument thus furnishes a reason to oppose 
an action one might otherwise approve based on a calculation that the 
immediate benefits of approval are outweighed by the risk of much more 
serious long-term costs. One who makes such a calculation typically is 
led to oppose any and all movement from the status quo in a certain 
direction-and consequently to draw firm and unyielding doctrinal 
lines-as a kind of insurance policy against an extremely disfavored out-
come even when such a stance entails forgoing benefits that might accrue 
71 See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 378 (1985) (arguing 
that slippery slope arguments rest on the contention that "the lack of a clear line of demarca-
tion creates the risk of sliding down the slippery slope"). 
72 Id. at 361-62. 
73 Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1026, 
1030 (2003). To similar effect, see DOUGLAS WALTON, SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS 1 
(1992); David J. Mayo, The Role ofSlippery Slope Arguments in PublicPolicy Debates, 21-22 
PIL. EXCHANGE 81(1992); Wibren van der Burg, The Slippery Slope Argument, 102 ETHICS 
42 (1991). 
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from permitting movement to some intermediate position between the 
status quo and the feared catastrophic endpoint. So, to invoke a well-
known example, even if it is true that permitting voluntary physician-
assisted suicide by the terminally ill would relieve needless suffering for 
many, it might nevertheless reasonably be resisted if it in fact represents 
the first step down a slippery slope to compulsory euthanasia, which 
might be disastrous. 74 
Slippery slope arguments have not normally found much success in 
constitutional law. The Court has generally been hesitant to construe the 
Constitution to disable all purportedly beneficial government action in 
some field on the speculative fear not only that the government might 
then take additional, more extreme actions, but that the Court would 
somehow find itself unable to invalidate the later actions on account of 
having previously approved something less extreme.75 Evidently, the 
Court generally believes itself fundamentally capable of disapproving ac-
tions that deserve disapproval on the merits when and if it encounters 
them. 
This has been true even when it comes to protecting some of the 
most important and sensitive of individual rights. For example, the 
Court has displayed no fear of slippery slopes in its evolving Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence of unreasonable searches. One might plausi-
bly think that the Constitution should be construed to draw firm lines 
when it comes to police searches on the theory that the police, if granted 
one form of authority to search, will soon press it to and beyond its logi-
cal limits, thereby guaranteeing more intrusive police work in the future. 
If anyone has made such an argument to the Court, it has been unmoved: 
a series of judicial decisions have in fact facilitated a slide down a slip-
pery slope to the point where the Fourth Amendment provides relatively 
few constraints on the authority to search.76 
One of the few areas of constitutional law where fears of the slip-
pery slope do seem to have some purchase, however, is in the area of free 
74 For discussion of the euthanasia example, see, for example, DAVID LAMB, DOWN THE 
SLIPPERY SLOPE: ARGUING IN APPLIED Emics (1988); Eric Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments 
and Legal Reasoning, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 1469, 1471-72 (1999). 
75 The perceived inability of human beings to stick to their previous decisions is, to some 
extent, the key assumption behind a slippery slope argument. David Enoch, Once You Start 
Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You're on a Very Slippery Slope, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
629, 632 (2001) ("[L]imited creatures as we are, we cannot (or are not likely to). . . stop 
midway down the slope"); Schauer, supra note 71, at 374 ("At times slippery slope arguments 
may be pleas to decisionmakers who fear their own weaknesses."). 
76 The relentless expansion of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement pro-
vides an especially clear example. Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed: 
The Rise of a Public Place Exemption to the WarrantRequirement, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 
375 (1986). But, the trend cuts across almost all areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
See Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757 (1994). 
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speech.77 Although content-neutral regulation of speech based on its 
time, place, or manner is permitted under certain circumstances,78 regula-
tion of speech on the basis of its content is generally prohibited with 
surprising vigor even when the speech in question is undisputedly of lit-
tle value. The First Amendment has thus been construed to forbid gov-
ernment limitation of speech promoting Nazism, 79 defaming public 
figures,s0 burning a cross to express a message of racial subordination,81 
and using deeply offensive language in a public place, all rulings sug-
gesting a belief that something much more is at stake in these cases than 
the particular instances of speech the state wished to suppress on the 
occasions in question. 
Some First Amendment doctrines go even further by prohibiting 
government not only from limiting protected speech but prohibiting it 
from getting anywhere in the vicinity of protected speech. The First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, for example, bars state limitation even 
of otherwise legitimately prohibitablespeech when doing so might cause 
individuals whose speech would be protected to refrain from speaking 
for fear of prosecution, even when the fear is unfounded.82 First Amend-
ment doctrines disfavoring statutory vagueness and prior restraint serve 
similar purposes.83 If absolutist protection for even low-value speech 
seems calculated to prevent even the tiniest slide down a slippery slope 
to government censorship, then the doctrines of overbreadth, vagueness, 
and prior restraint seem calculated to prevent government even from get-
ting within shouting distance of the edge of the slope. Although anti-
regulatory absolutism is thus unusual in constitutional law in general, 
such an approach in the campaign arena might be less surprising, at least 
to the extent it is tied to application of First Amendment principles of 
free speech. 
B. Slippery Slope Formulationsin the Campaign Context 
Like any arguments, slippery slope arguments come in stronger and 
weaker forms. In their weakest form, slippery slope arguments often re-
present little more than irrational appeals to fear of change: "A horrible 
situation is sketched, which of course nobody would want but which is 
77 Schauer, supra note 71, at 363. 
78 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
79 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
80 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323 (1974).
81 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
82 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 
518 (1972); Mayo, supra note 73, at 81 (characterizing recognition of the "chilling effect" of a 
regulation as a kind of slippery slope argument). 
83 Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (vagueness doctrine); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444 (1938) (prior restraint). 
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so highly speculative that the cogency of the argument-insofar as it 
exists-depends more upon the horror than upon the likelihood." 84 In 
their stronger and more serious forms, however, slippery slope argu-
ments can have a good deal more force. Although all slippery slope ar-
guments inevitably rely on both a fear of an undesirable end state and a 
necessarily speculative prediction about the likelihood of its arrival,85 the 
stronger arguments rely on predictions that are better grounded in empiri-
cal realities. It is easy to conjure up a parade of horribles. It is more 
difficult-though sometimes possible-to give a plausible account of 
how those horribles may come to pass and how likely it is that they will 
do So. 8 6 Any analysis of slippery slope arguments that attempts to take 
them seriously therefore requires identification both of what lies at the 
bottom of the slope, and the series of events by which it is contended that 
any movement in the disfavored direction is likely to precipitate a slide 
to the bottom, thereby justifying an absolutist stance against the proposed 
change. 
So what does lie at the bottom of the slippery slope in the campaign 
arena that the Court and other absolutist opponents of campaign regula-
tion are so keen to avoid? This is, unfortunately, difficult to say with 
certainty. Advocates on all sides of the campaign finance debate are 
often vague about both what they believe to be at stake and the mecha-
nisms by which government regulation might or might not influence 
those stakes.87 Despite this reticence, it nevertheless seems possible to 
infer a likely and indeed rather conventional fear that may provoke the 
greatest anxiety concerning regulation of campaign speech: fear of the 
loss of efficacious democratic self-rule,88 especially the fear of govern-
mental self-perpetuation in power. 
84 See van der Burg, supra note 73, at 43; see also LAMB, supra note 74, at viii (noting 
that in this form "many philosophers have dismissed the slope argument as a method of falla-
cious reasoning"). 
85 Regarding the foundational fear of an undesirable end state, see Schauer, supra note 
71, at 365 ("the danger case"); Mayo, supra note 73, at 86 (adopting Schauer's terminology); 
Enoch, supranote 75, at 631 ("the morally unacceptable outcome"). On the empirical founda-
tions of causal slippery slope arguments, see Enoch, supra note 75, at 633 (arguing that slope 
arguments "rely heavily on empirical evidence"); van der Burg, supra note 73, at 52 (arguing 
that whether a slope argument "is plausible is a different, empirical, question"); Schauer, supra 
note 7 1, at 381 ("[A] persuasive slippery slope argument depends for its persuasiveness upon 
temporally and spatially contingent empirical facts."). 
86 See Volokh, supra note 73 (offering an especially careful cataloguing of different 
ways in which slippery slope-based predictions of catastrophe might come to pass). 
87 See GARDNER, supra note 66, at 174 ("Both critics and defenders of regulated cam-
paign spending and contributions have generally been maddeningly vague about what they 
understand to be the actual relationship between money and votes."). This is not uncommon in 
slippery slope arguments; often only the first and last steps are specified, and the critical inter-
mediate steps are left to the imagination. WALTON, supra note 73, at 96-97. 
88 For a discussion on the widespread anxiety about the continued efficacy of democ-
racy, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DiscoNrwr 3 (1996). 
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The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that one of the core com-
mitments of the First Amendment-perhaps its single most important 
commitment-is to the proposition that political debate in the United 
States should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 89 "Competition 
in ideas and governmental policies," the Court has elaborated, "is at the 
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms,"90 
and in consequence "the First Amendment . . . has its fullest and most 
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political of-
fice."91 These are propositions that justify protection for political speech 
in terms of effective democratic self-governance, a common and well-
rehearsed account of the structural role of First Amendment freedoms.92 
On this view, government regulation of campaigns might plausibly 
be thought to raise especially serious concerns. Because government in a 
representative democracy consists for the most part of elected incum-
bents-individuals who tend to be politicians and partisans-the levers 
of power in a democracy are held by those who almost by definition have 
a vested interest in the outcome of future election campaigns. 93 When 
government directs its powers toward the campaign phase-the critical 
and sensitive period in which voters formulate decisions about whom 
they will choose to hold power in the future-it is not unreasonable to 
worry that officials might attempt to use their power to insulate them-
selves from electoral displacement. Although there are undoubtedly 
more efficient means by which incumbents might entrench themselves in 
power,94 limiting speech is clearly one possible route to that end. The 
state might thus punish political dissent, ban "unapproved" ideas, limit 
the opportunities for regime opponents to speak, or employ any number 
of methods, well-known in modem totalitarian states, to prevent the elec-
89 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
90 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
91 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). 
92 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE PEOPLE 1-89 (1948). 
93 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New FirstAmendment Jurisprudence:A Threat to Lib-
erty, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 239 (Geoffrey R. Stone, Richard A. 
Epstein & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1992) ("[I]n the public domain the state is enforcing a view 
of the truth about itself. Because it is interested, it cannot be trusted."). 
94 Manipulation of voter eligibility and ballot tabulation processes seem most directly 
calculated to secure desired electoral results, and indeed such strategies have a long and sordid 
history in the United States, especially as applied to blacks in the Jim Crow South. To give 
just one of many possible examples, some states deliberately manipulated the categories of 
crimes eligible for the punishment of felon disenfranchisement based upon the incidence with 
which such crimes were committed by whites and blacks, respectively, permitting them selec-
tively to disenfranchise black voters. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
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torate from hearing or adopting ideas that might dispose them to vote 
against incumbent power-holders.95 
To approach government regulation of campaign spending with 
some or even great apprehension and skepticism thus seems well justi-
fied; the monster imagined to lie at the bottom of the slippery slope is 
indeed monstrous. On the other hand, as previously described, many 
good reasons have been advanced to justify at least some government 
regulation of campaign spending, and they cannot all plausibly be dis-
missed on the merits. Consistent with the internal logic of slippery slope 
arguments, then, the defensibility of refusing to countenance any regula-
tion whatsoever of campaign spending necessarily rests on the plausibil-
ity of the speculative contention that permitting some-or even any-
government regulation of campaign spending will launch the nation 
down the slope to an inevitable loss of democratic self-rule. 
But by what mechanisms or series of events might such a catastro-
phe occur? It is especially important to get this piece of the argument 
right. Most slippery slope arguments rest ultimately on empirical prem-
ises about the world,9 6 and it is therefore impossible to evaluate the plau-
sibility of such an argument without a clear understanding of the precise 
sequence of events that its proponents claim empirically is likely to en-
sue following a change from the status quo. Yet this is of course the very 
piece of most slippery slope arguments that is usually the least devel-
oped,97 if for no other reason than that it requires the advocate to appeal 
not to vague and remote fears of imagined catastrophes but rather to con-
crete factual contentions and predictions that are inherently speculative 
and thus far more vulnerable to critique. 
Anti-regulatory absolutism in the campaign context, no less than 
slippery slope arguments in other areas, tends to suffer from this defect. 
Its proponents for the most part gesture toward a vaguely articulated fear 
of an erosion of democratic self-rule and the freedoms it secures, and 
often seem to stop there without specifying how exactly permitting, say, 
limitations on the amount candidates can contribute to their own cam-
paigns98 is likely to launch us on an irreversible path to a collapse of 
democratic self-governance. This is precisely the piece of the argument 
95 This nightmare vision reaches its apotheosis in GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-
FOUR (1949) where, according to Orwell himself, the tools of the state were deployed so that 
"heretical thought . . . should be literally unthinkable," quoted in MICHAEL HALBERSTAM, 
TOTALITARIANISM AND THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF POLrrIcs 121 (1999). 
96 See van der Burg, supra note 73. 
97 See WALTON, supra note 73, at 97 (slippery slope arguments can appear "worrisome 
and even menacing partly because so much is unstated"); Mayo, supra note 73, at 91 (the 
premises of slippery slope arguments may be "wildly hypothetical" and undeveloped); van der 
Burg, supra note 73, at 43 (noting that a parade of horribles may substitute for sound 
argument). 
98 Invalidated in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51-54 (1976). 
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that I wish to explore, however, and as a result I must speculate a bit 
myself about the slippery slope mechanics that might underlie the very 
pronounced anti-regulatory absolutism of the Supreme Court and its 
supporters. 
Subject to these limitations, I want to suggest three different 
(though related) possible formulations of the slippery slope, all of which 
rest on the fear of incumbent self-entrenchment and a consequent loss of 
popular democratic agency, and all of which find some support in what is 
for the most part a scanty and indirect record. For now, I will simply lay 
these out without comment, reserving discussion for the next Part. 
First and most straightforwardly, it is possible that permitting gov-
ernment regulation of campaign spending will send us down the slippery 
slope to incumbent self-entrenchment through an escalating sequence of 
direct prohibitions of dissenting speech and ideas. On this account, it is a 
short and certain step from permitting any regulation of campaign spend-
ing at all to the conversion of the United States into another Soviet Union 
or North Korea, where all speech must meet the approval of the 
government. 
A second and more sophisticated version of the slippery slope is 
that creeping limitations on campaign spending will lead increasingly to 
losses of information in the political sphere to the point where democ-
racy ceases to function adequately. Here, the idea is that democratic citi-
zens need good information to perform their functions properly; 
restricting campaign speech limits the amount of good information avail-
able to voters; and at some point political information becomes so scarce 
that voters cannot make reasoned decisions about how to vote. 
Finally, it has been argued that the mechanics of the slippery slope 
of campaign regulation lead to incumbent self-entrenchment by way of 
an indirect prohibition of dissent, effectuated by limiting campaign 
spending to the point where it is insufficient to unseat an incumbent. On 
this account, spending limits favor incumbents because it is cheaper for 
an incumbent than for a challenger to win elected office, and govern-
ment, once permitted to enact such limitations, will inevitably make them 
lower and lower until the point where no incumbent, no matter how un-
deserving of reelection, can reliably be dislodged. 
In the next Part, I subject each of these versions of the slippery 
slope to closer scrutiny. I conclude that none of them is especially plau-
sible, and that even the best account of the absolutist position against 
regulation of campaign speech and spending therefore rests on weak 
foundations. 
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IV. EVALUATING THE SLIPPERY SLOPE MECHANICS 
Although slippery slope arguments necessarily rest on speculation, 
and speculative arguments are inherently weak, this very weakness para-
doxically provides slippery slope arguments with an odd kind of 
strength. Precisely because they are speculative, they can be refuted only 
by counter-speculation. But since counter-speculation can never be con-
clusive, a slippery slope argument can never be fully refuted, and one 
speculative avenue can always be replaced by another. 99 Consequently, 
slippery slope arguments display an unusual degree of resilience; they 
can be wounded, but not killed.' 00 This problem is compounded here 
because I am myself speculating to some degree about what anti-regula-
tory absolutists would say if forced to articulate the details of their slip-
pery slope arguments. Nevertheless, with this caveat in mind, I turn to 
the three different slippery slope mechanisms identified in the preceding 
Part. 
A. Slope 1: Direct Suppression of Dissent 
The first kind of slippery slope mechanism is also the most wide-
spread in First Amendment jurisprudence. This is the argument that gov-
ernment must be denied completely the power to regulate campaign 
speech-and, to the extent it is a kind of speech, campaign spend-
ing' 0 1-because granting government even the tiniest authority to do so 
puts us on a slippery slope to a certain regime of suppression of political 
dissent and a consequent loss of democratic self-governance. 
The idea that a significant function of the First Amendment is to 
prevent government suppression of political dissent is a venerable one.10 2 
In a forthcoming article, Professor Richard L. Hasen expressly links cur-
rent opposition to campaign finance regulation to the "fear that incum-
99 As van der Burg observes, "For the slippery slope argument, especially in its empirical 
version, usually no conclusive proof can be given, either for or against." van der Burg, supra 
note 73, at 64; see also Schauer, supra note 71, at 381 ("[Iln virtually every case in which a 
slippery slope argument is made, the opposing party could with equal formal and linguistic 
logic also make a [contrary] slippery slope claim."). 
100 This strikes me as supporting an insightful argument made by Mayo to the effect that 
slippery slope arguments are at bottom ideologically driven and thus not subject to empirical 
refutation at all. Mayo, supra note 73, at 95-96. 
101 The Court expressly equated campaign spending with campaigns speech, and afforded 
to the latter the same level of protection afforded to the former, in Buckley. 424 U.S. at 15-23. 
102 See, e.g., THOMAS 1. EMERSON, TowARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FRST AMEND-
MENT 9 (1963) (arguing that with respect to the "political process ... [it is here that the state 
has a special incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective power of sup-
pression"); ALEXANDER MEIKLEIOHN, POLMcAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PowERS OF 
THE PEOPLE 26 (1965) ("What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything 
worth saying shall be said. [C]onflicting points of view shall have. . . an assigned share of the 
time available."); id. at 27 (arguing that First Amendment protects against "mutilation of the 
thinking process of the community"). 
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bents will squelch criticism in a replay of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts," 03 laws enacted in 1798 by a Federalist Congress to suppress criti-
cism of the administration of John Adams.1" In fact, the fear may run 
even deeper. A more full-throated articulation of this kind of slippery 
slope mechanism may be found in the opening lines of Justice Scalia's 
dissent in Austin: 
Attention all citizens. To assure the fairness of elections 
by preventing disproportionate expression of the views 
of any single powerful group, your Government has de-
cided that the following associations of person shall be 
prohibited from speaking or writing in support of any 
candidate: .105 
In this mock announcement, which he goes on to describe as "Orwel-
lian,"106 Justice Scalia conjures the fear not merely that a sitting govern-
ment might enact a law that, like the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
criminalizes criticism of sitting government officials, but that it might 
suppress dissent through a much more active process of deciding who 
can speak, on what topics, and with what points of view. This is, it must 
be stressed, an account that has been given across the spectrum of judi-
cial opinion. In opposing a federal ban on campaign spending by labor 
unions more than thirty years before Austin was decided, Justice Douglas 
wrote: 
Some may think that one group or another should not 
express its views in an election because it is too power-
ful, because it advocates unpopular ideas, or because it 
has a record of lawless action. But these are not justifi-
cations for withholding First Amendment rights from 
any group-labor or corporate.107 
The fear, then, seems to be that permitting government to regulate cam-
paign spending will lead step by step to a dystopian world in which the 
government perpetuates its own power by deciding what may be said and 
by whom. 
103 Richard L. Hasen, What the Court Did-and Why, Am. INr. ONLINE (July-Aug. 
2010), http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=853. 
104 Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, ch. 74, §§ 1, 2, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801). 
105 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
106 Id. 
107 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 597 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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We can all agree, no doubt, on the undesirability of this nightmarish 
result.108 The more pertinent question, however, is whether permitting 
even the slightest bit of regulation of campaign spending will launch us 
irreversibly toward such a fate. This seems highly improbable. The ulti-
mate fear of slippery slopists on this account is of content-based govern-
ment censorship of political speech. Limitations on campaign spending, 
however, are by definition content-neutral; they apply to all spending on 
all campaigns, regardless of the party affiliation or views of either the 
spender or the candidate on whose behalf campaign funds are spent. 09 
To claim that this kind of regulation will lead to the government picking 
and choosing who can speak and to what issues on the basis of content 
presupposes one of two developments, each of which is implausible. 
One possibility is that content-neutral regulation of campaign 
spending leads inevitably to content-based regulation of campaign 
spending-that permitting government to place a cap on spending by all 
candidates or citizens will result predictably in government gaining au-
thority to place a spending cap selectively on Republicans, or liberals, or 
regime opponents, on the basis of their message. This seems highly im-
probable. Although always speculative, slippery slope arguments can be 
more plausible if the initial step that is opposed requires removing the 
only presently existing barrier to movement toward the bottom of the 
slope, and does so without proposing a new or alternative barrier.110 In 
this case, however, a plethora of other barriers make a slide into Justice 
Scalia's nightmare unlikely. 
In First Amendment jurisprudence, the line between content-neutral 
and content-based regulation of speech is long-standing, well-under-
stood, and well-defended across a wide variety of domains."'1 Content-
based suppression of dissenting speech has long been publicly regarded 
as illegitimate, and in a way that seems firmly woven into both our law 
1lo Consensus on the undesirability of the state of affairs at the bottom of a slippery slope 
is of course a condition for the validity of a slippery slope argument. LAMB, supra note 74, at 
5. 
109 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (concluding that spending limits are "neutral 
as to the ideas expressed"). The Court similarly acknowledged the content-neutrality of such 
restrictions when it explained that spending limitations were subject to strict scrutiny not be-
cause they regulated on the basis of content, but because "the present Act's contribution and 
expenditure limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and as-
sociation by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties in addition to any reasonable 
time, place, and manner regulations otherwise imposed." Id. at 18. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court explicitly found it unnecessary to consider whether such limitations had a 
disparate impact on the speech or electoral prospects of any particular class of candidates. Id. 
at 31 n.33. 
110 van der Burg, supra note 73, at 58-59. 
111 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (nonpublic forums); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (symbolic conduct); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288 (1984) (time, place, and manner restrictions). 
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and our social practices. Past American experience with attempted sup-
pression of dissent arising from the Alien and Sedition Acts, abolition-
ism, labor unionism, McCarthyism, the civil rights movement, and 
opposition to the Vietnam War, to name just a few examples, furnish 
ready and durable baselines against which content-based limitations on 
campaign spending might be found wanting both by courts and in the 
court of public opinion.112 
One argument that is often used to defend assertions of the exis-
tence of a dangerous slippery slope is the contention that public attitudes 
cannot serve as an effective backstop against further sliding down the 
slope because such attitudes may themselves become altered by any ini-
tial movement in the direction of the disfavored outcome.113 Thus oppo-
nents of compulsory euthanasia sometimes argue that we should not 
permit physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill because doing so 
creates a new world in which physician-assisted suicide seems accept-
able, making it more likely that some next step, such as general voluntary 
euthanasia, could be publicly perceived as acceptable, and so on down 
the slope to the bottom.114 In the present case, one might therefore argue 
that we should not permit content-neutral limits on campaign spending 
because, even though content-based spending limitations are easily dis-
tinguished in principle, a world in which content-neutral spending caps 
are permitted may be one in which selectively content-based spending 
caps might no longer seem so obviously improper. 
This is the most difficult kind of slippery slope argument to refute 
because such a development can never be ruled out. On the other hand, 
slippery slope arguments must stand or fall on the empirical plausibility 
of their speculations, and this speculation seems deeply implausible. 
112 Interestingly, it is the Court itself that, in Citizens United, seemed to set up the basis 
for a possible erosion of the longstanding distinction between content-based and content-neu-
tral regulation of speech by introducing the idea that speech may not be restricted "based on 
the identity of the speaker." See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010). This 
development in categorizing speech regulation has the potential to blur the distinction between 
the two established categories. The Court has not previously viewed the elaboration of regula-
tory criteria as tantamount to singling out particular topics or viewpoints for suppression, even 
though that has often been the consequence. For example, in Clark, the Court treated as con-
tent-neutral a federal ordinance prohibiting protest camping in Lafayette Park, the small na-
tional park across the street from the White House, even though it is obvious that the "identity" 
of "protest campers" will be confined to people who think that sleeping in tents across the 
street from the White House is an effective way to express their message. See 468 U.S. 288 
(1984). At a minimum, such people will be speaking in opposition to government policy. 
113 Volokh calls these "attitude-altering slippery slopes." Volokh, supra note 73, at 
1036-132. It is unclear, however, to what extent a change in public opinion in favor of an 
action following taking that action should count as a reason against having taken the action. 
See van der Burg, supra note 73, at 51-52 (noting that on any moral theory other than one that 
conceives moral views to be permanently fixed, the possibility that taking an action might alter 
social understandings of morality cannot count as a reason to avoid the action). 
114 See Lam, supra note 74, ch. 4. 
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Content-neutral limits on campaign spending have existed in this country 
for more than a centuryI1 -or at least did exist until the last of them was" 5 
invalidated in Citizens United-and there is no evidence whatsoever that 
the existence of these restrictions softened public resistance to govern-
ment restrictions on speech based on its content. Indeed, during this pe-
riod the Court created strong protections against content-based 
regulation.' 16 Regarding campaign spending in particular, the one piece 
of evidence we have runs the other way: apparently on the basis of fear 
that early restrictions on corporatecampaign spending fell disproportion-
ately on ideologically conservative speech, Congress subsequently at-
tempted to make such restrictions more ideologically symmetrical by 
extending them to labor unions."" 
The second possible way in which restrictions on campaign spend-
ing might precipitate a slide down a slippery slope to an Orwellian sup-
pression of dissent is if a government that possesses the authority to 
regulate spending inevitably will develop expertise sufficient to permit it 
to deploy facially content-neutral spending restrictions in a way that se-
lectively and effectively targets only spending that would be used to sup-
port dissenting speech. This seems even less likely. Content-neutral 
tools of speech regulation are by definition blunt and unreliable tools for 
the suppression of speech based on its content-too blunt to permit the 
kind of precise control that would be necessary for government regula-
tion to have any appreciable selective impact on dissenting speech. 
Moreover, the contingency and constant shifting of the social practices 
and communication technologies to which such regulations would neces-
sarily be applied preclude any realistic possibility that government might 
be able to foresee how specific campaign spending limits might influence 
the aggregate content of campaign speech, especially in the long term. A 
regulation that today falls disproportionately on regime opponents might 
in the next election cycle fall disproportionately on its supporters. It is, 
115 Such limits first appeared in the Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 
(1907), which prohibited campaign contributions by corporations. One might even make the 
case that the origins of content-neutral regulation of campaign spending has even earlier roots, 
in the Pendleton Act of 1883, ch. 27, §§ 11-14, 22 Stat. 403 (1883), which prohibited political 
contributions by federal employees. 
116 The Court's entire First Amendment jurisprudence was created after enactment of the 
Tillman Act; it did not issue its very first ruling construing the First Amendment's protection 
for freedom of speech until 1919. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
117 War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167 
(1943). Some of the history is laid out in United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 578-79 (1957). 
For background, see David J. Sousa, "No Balance in the Equities": Union Power in the Mak-
ing and Unmaking of the Campaign Finance Regime, 13 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 374 (1999). 
For a different view, see Winkler, Other People's Money, supra note 54, at 928-30 (arguing 
that the principal justification for limiting spending by both corporations and unions was con-
trolling agency problems for the purpose of preventing abuse of funds collected from others to 
be used for other purposes). 
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after all, precisely their neutrality that has for decades induced a Court 
deeply suspicious of content-based regulation of speech to evaluate con-
tent-neutral restrictions on speech much more leniently and 
generously." 8 
B. Slope 2: Loss of Electorally Relevant Information in the Public 
Sphere 
A second slippery slope mechanism sometimes evoked in the cases 
and commentary has to do less with selective government censorship of 
disfavored expression than with a generalized choking off of all forms of 
electorally relevant information to the point where meaningful demo-
cratic self-governance is threatened. Although models of democracy can 
differ widely,1 19 even the most minimalist accounts conceive of democ-
racy as a mechanism by which the ruled can hold their rulers accountable 
by throwing them out of office for unsatisfactory performance.120 To 
discharge this function, voters need enough information about the per-
formance of the incumbent regime to permit them to make informed 
judgments.121 
In many of its campaign finance decisions, the Supreme Court has 
indicated discomfort with the capacity of spending and contribution limi-
tations to restrict the amount of information available to voters. In Buck-
ley v. Valeo, for example, the Court approached federally imposed 
118 Unlike content-based regulations, which typically get strict scrutiny, content-neutral 
regulations typically are evaluated under the more lenient O'Brien standard. United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
I think the considerations mentioned in this Part are sufficient to answer the charge im-
plicitly made by Justice Scalia in Citizens United that a ban on corporate campaign spending is 
not content-neutral in effect: "to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal 
agents of the modem free economy," 130 S. Ct. at 816. By this, I take Justice Scalia to mean 
that corporate speech inherently tilts toward support for free markets. I am not sure on what 
basis he believes this to be true, considering that earlier in his opinion he takes pains to point 
out that "religious, educational, and literary" entities also frequently take corporate form. Id. 
at 813. In any case, his fear seems, perhaps typically, badly overblown. Had Congress, by 
banning direct political expenditures by corporations, wished to place a thumb on the scale of 
public discourse to tilt it against the free market-which I do not believe to have been the 
case-it clearly failed miserably. Positions in favor of capitalism and the free market, I think 
it is fair to say, have been more than well represented in American political and electoral 
discourse during the period between passage of the Tillman Act and the Court's decision in 
Citizens United. Indeed, for most (all?) of the twentieth century, support for capitalism at 
home and abroad was the official policy of the democratically elected United States govern-
ment, even without unlimited corporate campaign spending. 
119 See, e.g., DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987). 
120 The classic minimalist account is JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY (1942). 
121 See ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); see also Citi-
zens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 ("Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the 
means to hold officials accountable to the people . . .. [It] is a precondition to enlightened 
self-government. . . ."). 
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spending limits from the principle that "[i]n a republic where the people 
are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices 
among candidates for office is essential." 2 2 Spending limits threaten 
that function, the Court suggested, because "[a] restriction on the amount 
of money a person or group can spend on political communication during 
a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression."l 2 3 Govern-
ment, the Court has said, cannot be permitted to restrict the ability of 
speakers to "present[ ] both facts and opinions to the public,"1 2 4 thereby 
"limiting the stock of information from which members of the public 
may draw." 12 5 To the extent that campaign speech is curtailed, various 
members of the Court have argued, "the electorate is deprived of infor-
mation, knowledge and opinion vital to its function." 26 
It is true, of course, that restricting campaign spending reduces the 
total amount of campaign speech-that is generally its goal127-and that 
restricting the total amount of speech made during campaigns restricts 
the total volume of information available to voters. It may similarly be 
conceded that a sufficiently severe diminution in the amount of informa-
tion available to voters during a campaign may impair the ability of some 
voters to do their jobs in the way contemplated by democratic theory, 128 
and that this could pose dangers to meaningful democratic self-rule. The 
relevant question, however, is not whether restricting campaign spending 
limits speech, or whether it limits the total amount of information availa-
122 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976). 
123 Id. at 19. 
124 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010). 
125 First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
126 See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 144 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also 
United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It is . . . vitally 
important . .. that the people have access to the views of every group in the community."). 
127 In particular, Congress seemed concerned when it enacted FECA to reduce the amount 
of what it considered to be low-content "spot" advertisements-30- or 60-second ads for can-
didates-that, in its judgment, did not meaningfully advance the understanding of the electo-
rate yet resulted in a serious escalation of the cost of campaigning. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 
28,998 (1971) (material introduced by Sen. Stevenson); id. at 29,005 (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke); id. at 29,321 (remarks of Sen. Muskie); 117 CONG. REc. 26,943 (1971) (remarks of 
Sen. Stevenson); id. at 28,819 (material introduced by Sen. Cotton). According to the commit-
tee report, reducing the total amount of speech would, paradoxically, result in better-quality 
speech and therefore better quality campaigns, and thus the goals of FECA were both "wider 
and more penetrating dissemination of views and issues in an election, and limiting the cost of 
campaigning for public office," which were understood to be consistent. S.REP. No. 92-96, at 
1777 (1971). 
128 1 say "may" and "some" because I find this proposition doubtful, though I do not wish 
to dispute it here. I find it doubtful because I doubt that voters rely very significantly on 
information they obtain during a campaign to decide how they are going to vote. Most of the 
information they will rely upon they acquire well before the campaign ever gets underway. 
See GARDNER, supra note 66, ch. 3, for a fuller elaboration of this view. It is unnecessary to 
take this position to demonstrate that the slippery slope argument under consideration is weak, 
because it is weak even under the more common set of assumptions that I dispute in my book. 
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ble in the campaign environment, but whether it is plausible to think that 
permitting any limitations at all on spending will set us inevitably on the 
road to democratic ruin by leading eventually to what amounts function-
ally to an information blackout. This seems implausible. 
The problem of democratic failure might come in one of two related 
versions, depending upon how voters actually behave when an absence 
of adequate campaign information leaves them so profoundly ignorant as 
to be unable to come to informed judgments about the merits of candi-
dates. One possibility is that when voters lack inadequate information 
their decisions become essentially random.129 In this circumstance, al-
though incumbents do not benefit systematically from reducing the 
amount of available information, democratic accountability nevertheless 
is unacceptably undermined. A second possibility might be that a low 
information campaign environment disproportionately favors incum-
bents. If this is the case, then voters who lack information adequate to do 
their jobs will tend to default in their voting behavior to a baseline pre-
sumption in favor of retaining incumbents.130 In this situation, incum-
bents will remain entrenched because low information chokes off 
democratically adequate competition. I discuss the first possibility here, 
and defer consideration of the second to the next Part, which deals gener-
ally with the problem of incumbent entrenchment. 
The possibility that permitting some moderate and reasonable re-
strictions on campaign spending could lead not just eventually, but inevi-
tably and irreversibly, to this kind of destruction of democratic 
accountability seems highly improbable. This is easiest to see in the con-
text in which the Court decided Citizens United itself. There, the Court 
actually reversed field to move further up the slope from the point that it 
had previously occupied. Before Citizens United, the Court had already 
held, and then consistently affirmed in a series of rulings, that candidates 
for office, individual citizens who support particular candidates, private 
political associations, official political committees, and political parties 
all constitutionally cannot be barred from campaign spending in 
129 There is evidence that when voters are unable to decide among candidates on the basis 
of their merits, they sometimes rely on irrelevant cues such as the order in which candidates 
are listed on the ballot or the single piece of information to which they were most recently 
exposed. That is why in some jurisdictions ballot order is rotated so as to randomize the 
impact of irrational votes, and why in all jurisdictions electioneering at the polling place is 
forbidden. See James A. Gardner, Neutralizing the Incompetent Voter: A Comment on Cook v. 
Gralike, I ELECTION L.J. 49 (2002) (describing irrational voting and how it may be addressed). 
130 Recent research suggests that this may not in fact be the case; rather, the least knowl-
edgeable voters may harbor a bias against supporting the incumbent. See Thomas G. Hansford 
& Brad T. Gomez, Estimating the Electoral Effects of Voter Turnout, 104 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 
268, 270-71, 280 (2010) (discussing and then finding evidence supporting an "anti-incumbent 
effect" of increased voter turnout). 
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whatever amounts they choose.13' The only limit that existed at the time 
the Court decided Citizens United, and the one its ruling in that case 
overturned, was a ban on campaign spending from general treasuries by 
for-profit corporations and labor unions. 
The Court's movement up the slope seems especially unwarranted 
in these circumstances. As indicated earlier, the existence of backstops 
that supplement the barrier sought to be removed makes a slide down the 
slope less probable, thereby undermining slippery slope objections to 
13 2permitting the contested initial move. Here, the Court's earlier rulings 
guaranteeing unlimited spending by virtually every other actor in the po-
litical arena-rulings which are clear, unequivocal, and well-defended-
make any further movement down the slope toward the disappearance of 
campaign information unlikely. The constitutional entitlement to unlim-
ited campaign spending enjoyed by candidates, voters, and private 
groups, moreover, made it extremely unlikely-indeed, absurdly un-
likely-that campaign information would dry up to any dangerous de-
gree, or even to any degree at all. 13 3 It is true that before Citizens United 
not every single dollarin the entire U.S. economy was in principle avail-
able for spending on campaign speech, but it is equally true that every 
single personwith money to spend on campaign speech and the incentive 
to do so was able before Citizens United to spend as much as he or she 
wished. 134 
131 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50-54 (1976) (candidates); id. at 44-50 (individual 
citizens); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (private associations); FEC 
v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (political committees); Colo. Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (political parties). 
132 van der Burg, supra note 73, at 58-59. 
133 It has been suggested, intriguingly, that because overtly partisan political speech of the 
type found in campaigns is generated by people with extraordinarily strong incentives to prop-
agate it, such speech may exhibit all the characteristics of robustness that the Court has in-
voked to justify affording a lesser degree of constitutional protection to commercial speech. 
Daniel Halberstam, CommercialSpeech, ProfessionalSpeech, and the ConstitutionalStatus of 
Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 797 (1999) ("[Plartisan political speech appears as 
robust as commercial speech."). 
134 It has sometimes been complained that the Court's previous rulings drew a line be-
tween for-profit corporations and other speakers that was arbitrary-e.g., that a rich individual 
could spend without limit whereas a rich corporation could not, even if the individual's wealth 
was accrued from corporate activity. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that corporations 'amas[s] large 
treasures' [is] not sufficient justification for the suppression of speech, unless one thinks it 
would be lawful to prohibit men and women whose net worth is above a certain figure from 
endorsing political candidates."). It must be emphasized that an argument from arbitrariness is 
different from a slippery slope argument. Indeed, the existence of a line that is clear,even if it 
is also arbitrary, is generally taken to undermine the power of a slippery slope objection. 
Schauer, supra note 71, at 379-80. In this case, the line between for-profit corporations and 
any other institution (including individuals, candidates, parties, etc.) is relatively clear-cut and 
therefore easy to discern and respect. 
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But even if these earlier rulings had not created an environment 
tilted decisively toward unlimited campaign spending, the Court's fear 
that limiting spending could send us down a slippery slope to voter igno-
rance and inefficacy seems seriously overblown. This is because the 
Court's fears apparently rest on fundamentally mistaken conceptions 
about the campaign arena and how it actually works. 
First, the Court has misidentified the salient problem. The real 
problem of contemporary election campaigns is not the risk of informa-
tion starvation, but the risk of information overload. In today's society 
of instantaneous and ubiquitous communication, the main problem voters 
face is not a dearth of relevant information but an overabundance of it. 135 
The amount of information available, particularly in the very kind of 
high-salience races in which high spending is most likely, is often far too 
much for any individual to work through, 136 requiring even the most re-
sponsible and dedicated of voters to develop coping strategies. As a 
flood of political science research demonstrates, most such strategies in-
volve selectively ignoring information that is readily available.137 To 
suggest, as the Court does, that every last dollop of additional speech 
during the campaign phase must be preserved because it might just fur-
nish voters with the game-changing piece of information is therefore 
highly implausible. 
In the real world of election campaigns, increased spending on cam-
paign communication is part of the problem, not part of its solution. As 
early as the 1970s, members of Congress were already complaining that 
too much money was being spent in campaigns, and that voters were 
135 BRYAN D. JONES, RECONCEIVING DECISION-MAKING IN DEMOCRATIC PoLrIcS: AT-
TENTION, CHOICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 95 (1994). 
136 DORIS A. GRABER, PROCESSING PoLICs: LEARNING FROM TELEVISION IN THE IN-
TERNET AGE 15, 46 (2001). 
137 This happens in numerous ways, at numerous phases of the process by which voters 
engage political information. For example, a selection bias frequently causes voters to ignore 
information that is inconsistent with their preexisting beliefs. See, e.g., GRABER, supra note 
136, at 19 (noting that voters find it easier to ignore than to grapple with challenging new 
information, and that as a result, "[m]ost political information is sloughed off"); Joanne M. 
Miller & Jon A. Krosnick, News Media Impact on the Ingredientsof PresidentialEvaluations: 
A Programof Research on the PrimingHypothesis, in POLITICAL PERSUASION AND ArrrrUDE 
CHANGE 79 (Diana C. Mutz et al. eds., 1996) (describing "'selectivity effects' on information 
processing"). A nearly symmetrical retention bias causes voters selectively to forget informa-
tion that does not agree with their settled opinions. See e.g., GRABER, supra note 136, at 14; 
Miller & Krosnick, supra note 137, at 79. Even more dramatic voter strategies for ignoring 
political information include rational ignorance, DowNs, supra note 121, ch. 11, and the use of 
"information shortcuts" or heuristics such as party loyalty, shorthand evaluations of candi-
dates' character and competence, and reliance on political symbols. SAMUEL L. PoPKIN, THE 
REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 7 (1991). 
For a fuller discussion, see GARDNER, supra note 66, ch. 4. 
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consequently bombarded excessively with political advertising.138 Such 
complaints played an important role in the legislative debates leading up 
to enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act. As Senator Dole 
complained during the 1971 debates: 
In today's world of nearly instantaneous communica-
tions, a prolonged audio-visual assault on the voting 
public is unnecessary and increasingly annoying. It has 
reached the point today where the public begins to feel it 
is being bombarded by an endless round of political pub-
licity and propaganda. And to a large extent, they are 
correct. Campaigns are too long. Their length exceeds 
the necessities of communications and debate and should 
be shortened.1 39 
Today, the problem has only gotten worse. Literally billions of dol-
lars are spent in each cycle on the election of candidates. Between the 
Court's rulings in Buckley and Citizens United, total spending in U.S. 
House races increased from $60 million in 1976 to $808 million in 
2008,140 an increase of nearly 1,500 percent, about quadruple the rate of 
inflation over the same period.141 Spending in Senate races increased 
over the same period from $38 million to $389 million,142 a ten-fold 
increase. The accessibility and low cost of the web has only made infor-
mation dissemination cheaper and easier, resulting in even greater availa-
bility of campaign information, around the clock, from a potentially 
unlimited number of competing sources.143 
Second, the Court's conception of the slippery slope to voter igno-
rance founders on a significant fact: voters already are ignorant despite 
an overabundance of campaign information. Study after study has 
shown consistently that voters tend to know little about electorally rele-
138 See e.g., 117 CONG. Rac. 29,321 (1971) (statement of Sen. Muskie) ("[M]edia spend-
ing should be limited so that no candidate can overwhelm his opponent or the electorate with 
an advertising campaign of monumental cost, and, in effect, buy his way into office.... It is a 
waste of resources and a distortion of the democratic process"); id. at 29,322 (1971) (Sen. 
Talmadge) ("Perhaps the most important function of this bill is that it will return elections to a 
mutual exchange of information instead of a massive sales campaign"). 
139 117 CONG. REc. 30,075 (1971). 
140 See House Campaign Expenditures, 1974-2008 (net dollars), CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN-
sTrruTE, http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/vital/VitalStatsjt2.pdf. 
141 See Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt. 
142 See Senate Campaign Expenditures, 1974-2008 (net dollars), CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN-
STrTUTE, http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/vitalVitalStats-t5.pdf. 
143 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNER-
SHIP MATTERS 88-123 (2007). Baker is quick to point out that the internet drastically reduces 
the cost of disseminating information; it does not necessarily lower the cost of creating content 
in the first place. See id. at 101-02. 
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vant facts and issues.1" If, amid an ocean of campaign information, vot-
ers still do not know the duties or terms of offices for which they vote, 
the names of incumbents, what issues are presently important, what in-
cumbents have done about them, or the positions of the various candi-
dates on those issues, then it seems unlikely that the problem to be feared 
is a reduction of information. Indeed, it seems doubtful that there is any 
particularly strong relationship between the availability of information 
and the willingness of voters to exploit it,145 or that more information is 
the cure to whatever might ail the polity. Remaining ignorant of cam-
paign information, as Anthony Downs demonstrated half a century ago, 
can even be a rational and, on some accounts, democratically legitimate 
method of political participation. 14 6 
Most fundamentally, however, the Court misunderstands the role of 
campaign speech in informing public political opinion. As I have ex-
plained elsewhere at some length, 147 public political opinion simply is 
not formed to any significant degree during campaigns. On the contrary, 
political opinion is formed continuously as a byproduct of ordinary and 
thoroughly routine engagement with daily public affairs. Among demo-
cratic citizens, the norm is for political opinion to form early, to evolve 
very gradually, to be largely immune from significant, much less sudden 
and dramatic revision, and for campaigns to have at best very little role 
in the formation of public political opinion, either at the individual or 
collective levels. As a result, government-imposed limits on the amount 
of spending and speech available during campaigns is unlikely to make 
much of a difference in how anyone votes, provided that protection for 
144 ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI 
& Scorr KEETER, WHAT AMERICAN KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996); 
ERIC R.A.N. SMITH, THE UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1989). 
145 "(M]any advocates of competence-generating proposals proceed as if merely provid-
ing new information is sufficient to improve [voter] competence. However, the transmission 
of socially relevant information is no 'Field of Dreams.' It is not true that 'if you build it, they 
will come.' Nor is it true that if they come, the effect will be as advocates anticipate." Arthur 
Lupia, DeliberationDisconnected: What It Takes to Improve Civic Competence, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., 133 (No. 2, Summer 2002), at 133, quoted in Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclo-
sures on Disclosure, Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-17 (June 
9, 2010), availableat 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 260 (2010). The Mayer paper also convincingly 
demonstrates the futility of naive and scattershot attempts to inform voters in other contexts. 
See generally Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures on Disclosure,supra. 
146 DowNs, supra note 121, ch. 11. This conclusion, however, stands in direct opposition 
to the conclusion reached by other branches of democratic theory, such as deliberative democ-
racy, which conditions democratic legitimacy on a high degree of citizen engagement. See, 
e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); IRIS 
MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000); Joshua Cohen, DeliberationandDemo-
cratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE (Alan Hamlin 
& Philip Pettit eds., 1989). 
147 See GARDNER, supra note 66, at 83-114. 
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ordinary political speech between campaigns is robust and consis-
tentl 4 8 -as it is under the current regime. 
C. Slope 3: Inability to Unseat Incumbents 
What may be the strongest slippery slope challenge to campaign 
spending restrictions rests on the fear that such measures, however well-
motivated, will have the unintended consequence of giving incumbents 
an advantage over challengers so significant that even the most rudimen-
tary kind of democratic accountability will be destroyed. Such objec-
tions have been part of the discourse of campaign finance reform for 
decades. Even as Congress first contemplated restricting campaign 
spending during deliberations on the Federal Election Campaign Act in 
1971 and its 1974 amendments, opponents objected to contribution and 
spending ceilings on the ground that limiting the ability of candidates to 
raise and spend money would amount to a kind of incumbent protec-
tion. 14 9 In its rulings, the Supreme Court has often expressed concerns to 
the effect that "the equalization of permissible campaign expenditures 
[through spending limitations] might serve not to equalize the opportuni-
ties of all candidates but to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial 
name recognition or exposure of his views before the start of the cam-
paign [i.e., a challenger]."15 0  Some commentators have strongly con-
demned spending and contribution limits on the ground that they 
"deliver[ ] merely the poisoned fruit of ever more entrenched 
incumbents."151 
Like its cousins, however, this slippery slope argument against 
spending restrictions rests on shaky foundations. In particular, it displays 
four characteristics of weak slippery slope arguments. First, it fails to 
account for the existence of alternate routes to the disfavored outcome. 
148 Id. at 182-89. 
149 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-229, at 116 (1971) (Supplemental Views of Messrs. Prouty, 
Cooper, and Scott) (Congress must "insure against enacting legislation which favors incum-
bent officeholders who are generally better known and better able to 'make news"'); S. REP. 
92-96, at 84 (1971) (Supplemental Views of Messrs. Prouty, Griffin, Baker, Cook and Ste-
vens), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1808 ("Perhaps the most difficult aspect of this 
legislation is to provide an overall ceiling which insures that the electorate has full access to 
pertinent information necessary for making an informed judgment in a political campaigns 
without enhancing the advantages for the very wealthy or the incumbent."). There was similar 
discussion during the floor debates. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REc. 42,065 (1971) (remarks of 
Reps. Long and MacDonald); id. at 46,947 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Dominick). 
150 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692-93 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("[W]ith evenly balanced speech incumbent officeholders generally win"); Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1976); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006) 
(Breyer, J.) ("[L]imits that are too low can also harm the electoral process by preventing 
challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby re-
ducing democratic accountability."). 
151 BeVier, supra note 65, at 1276. 
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Second, it overlooks the existence of backstops capable of halting an 
uncontrolled slide down the slope. Third, it relies on an exaggerated 
version of the harm that might reasonably ensue. Finally, it places exces-
sive and implausible weight on a single variable in a complex causal 
environment. 
1. Alternative Routes to the Same Harm 
As a matter of simple logic, the proponents of any slippery slope 
argument must be able to show that the disfavored outcome at the bottom 
of the slope-the one toward which they argue we ought not take even a 
single step-will not come to pass in any case, even if we avoid taking 
the initial step which they contend courts danger. 152 If the disfavored 
outcome will occur anyway, regardless of whether we take the particular 
measure that slippery slope proponents wish us to avoid, then there is no 
causal connection between the two events, and any tendency of the initial 
step to lead to the disfavored outcome cannot count as a reason to avoid 
taking that step because the disfavored outcome will occur anyway.153 
In the case of incumbent entrenchment, this condition clearly is not 
satisfied. The reason is obvious: incumbents already are entrenched, 
even though, for thirty-five years, campaign spending has been, by order 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, almost entirely free from limitation. Be-
tween 1980 and 2006, ninety-five percent of all incumbents nationwide 
who ran for reelection won their seats. 154 Under these conditions it is 
impossible to make a plausible case that limiting campaign spending 
could make incumbents more entrenched than they already are. The ob-
vious conclusion is that the causes of incumbent entrenchment, whatever 
they may be, do not lie in government regulation of campaign speech or 
spending. Though it is of course by no means logically compelled, a 
more intuitively appealing conclusion seems to be exactly the opposite of 
what anti-regulatory absolutists contend: the lack of spending limits 
might well be a factor contributing to incumbent entrenchment, an argu-
ment that proponents of such limitations have made for decades. 55 Cer-
152 See Enoch, supra note 75, at 636; van der Burg, supra note 73, at 61. 
153 See van der Burg, supra note 73. 
154 See Thomas Stratmann, Do Low ContributionLimits Insulate Incumbentsfrom Com-
petition?, 9 ELECTION L.J. 125, 127 (2009). According to other sources the figures are a 
ninety-three percent reelection rate for members of Congress between 1992 and 2000, JEN-
NIFER A. STEEN, SELF-FINANCED CANDIDATES IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONs 11 (2006), and 
ninety-four percent among state office-holders in 2007-08, Peter Quist, The Role of Money & 
Incumbency in 2007-2008 State Elections, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY INSTATE POLIT-
'Cs (May 6, 2010), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/PrintReportView.phtml?r-423. 
155 The arguments supporting this position are ably canvassed-though ultimately dis-
puted-in the opening paragraphs of Jeffrey Milyo & Timothy Groseclose, The ElectoralEf-
fects of Incumbent Wealth, 42 J.L. & EcON. 699, 699-702 (1999). Stratmann's recent study, 
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tainly the imposition of limits could not make things any worse than they 
are. 
2. Backstops Against an Uncontrolled Slide Down the Slope 
The second immediate difficulty with a slippery slope argument 
based on incumbent entrenchment is that it ignores the existence of sig-
nificant, defensible, and stable backstops against an uncontrollable slide 
all the way down the slope to the destruction of democratic accountabil-
ity. As noted earlier, a slippery slope argument is weaker to the extent 
that barriers to a complete descent down the slope continue to exist fol-
lowing the initial step onto the slope. 15 6 Here, the slippery slope argu-
ment is that we cannot permit any government restrictions on campaign 
spending because some government restrictions will lead to more, which 
will lead to more, and sooner or later the restrictions will be so severe 
that no challenger will be able to mount a campaign adequate to unseat 
an incumbent. 
This argument, however, misleadingly lumps every kind of cam-
paign spending together into a single, undifferentiated phenomenon. In 
fact, many different actors in the political arena spend money during 
campaigns, or wish to do so-candidates, official campaign committees, 
parties, news media, individuals, non-profit advocacy groups, political 
action committees, for-profit corporations, labor unions, and so forth. 
Not all of these actors, moreover, spend money in the same way or for 
the same purposes. The Court itself has often been attentive to such dif-
ferences. In striking down a federal limitation on independent spending 
by political parties, for example, the Court found that the political inter-
ests and objectives of parties and candidates diverge to a constitutionally 
significant extent.157 
Because campaign spending occurs in so many different domains, 
the slippery slope argument necessarily presupposes that if the govern-
ment is permitted to restrict spending by one group of actors-for-profit 
corporations, perhaps-then there is no resisting the government's even-
tual acquisition of authority to restrict spending by not-for-profits, politi-
cal parties, individuals, and, ultimately, candidates themselves, at which 
point the game is lost. But this result by no means follows. In fact, the 
Court's campaign jurisprudence has drawn sharp distinctions among all 
these categories of political actors. Rather than lumping all spending 
supra note 154, finding that lower contribution limitations increase electoral competitiveness 
might provide some recent empirical support for this contention. 
156 See Enoch, supra note 75. 
157 Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 622 (plurality opin-
ion) ("[T]he Government . .. argue[s] that the expenditure is 'coordinated' because a party and 
its candidate are identical, i.e., the party, in a sense, 'is' its candidates. We cannot assume, 
however, that this is so."). 
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restrictions together, the Court has separately analyzed the application of 
spending restrictions to each group, conducting distinct analyses that 
have generally taken account of each group's particular place and func-
tion in the campaign arena.' 58 If the Court has thus far been capable of 
distinguishing among different kinds of campaign spenders, there is no 
reason to think that a ruling permitting restrictions on one category of 
actors would put the Court in a position where it could no longer main-
tain the categorical distinctions upon which it has until now relied. 
Again, the only available evidence on this issue cuts against the 
slippery slope argument. For a century the Court found no constitutional 
impediment to government limitations on campaign spending by for-
profit corporations.15 9 Yet those rulings in no way impaired the ability 
of the Court later to decide that limitations on many other categories of 
campaign spenders were constitutionally invalid. Indeed, the Court's de-
cision in Citizens United demonstrates vividly its ability not merely to 
resist further sliding down the slope, but to scramble back uphill from a 
point it has become uncomfortable occupying. 
3. Exaggerated Account of the Potential Harm 
A threshold condition for the validity of a slippery slope argument 
is agreement that the result to be avoided is in fact harmful and thus 
something to be avoided.160 In the case of incumbent entrenchment, pro-
ponents of the slippery slope argument often seem to rely on an exagger-
ated and therefore contestable account of what exactly the entrenchment 
of incumbents means, and what degree of harm it would inflict on demo-
cratic values. 
One such problem arises from the difficulty of identifying incum-
bent entrenchment when it occurs. Everyone can agree that the "en-
trenchment" of incumbents is bad-therein lies the rhetorical appeal of 
the slippery slope argument-but what exactly does incumbent entrench-
ment mean, and how do we recognize it when we see it? Some possibili-
ties may be readily excluded. It cannot be evidence of incumbent 
entrenchment, for example, merely that some incumbents win reelection; 
that sets the bar too low, because even in the absence of entrenchment it 
is to be expected that some incumbents may legitimately earn reelection. 
Similarly, incumbent entrenchment cannot be limited to the case in 
which every single incumbent wins every race; that definition sets the 
158 See cases cited supra note 131. 
159 The Court has had several opportunities to invalidate restrictions on campaign expend-
itures by for-profit corporations, but in every case prior to Citizens United declined to do so. 
Austin v.Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 
567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
160 LAMB, supra note 74, at 5 ("The status of [a horrible results] argument depends prima-
rily on agreement regarding the horrible nature of the end result."). 
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bar too high, because even an unfairly entrenched incumbent presumably 
may be defeated in the right combination of circumstances. 
Rather, what the term "incumbent entrenchment" seems to mean is 
that some incumbents win reelection when in some sense they "should 
not"-when the seat "should" have been won by a challenger. Moreo-
ver, if incumbent entrenchment truly rises to the level of a genuine prob-
lem, then incumbents must be winning seats they ought to lose in 
significant numbers, and these wins are not offset to any meaningful ex-
tent by races in which challengers win seats that incumbents should have 
retained. The problem of incumbent entrenchment presumably must re-
fer not merely to some kind of general and randomly dispersed inaccu-
racy in election results, but to a bias that systematically benefits 
incumbents disproportionately. 1 6 1 
It is immediately clear, however, that any argument based on judg-
ments about which candidates "should" have won particular races will 
necessarily be controversial. On what grounds may it be determined that 
an incumbent who won a seat by collecting in actual fact more votes than 
his or her challenger "should" in truth have been outvoted? Any such 
judgment obviously relies to a great extent on an underlying normative 
model of electoral politics-whether, for example, voters "should" base 
their votes on party loyalty, 162 economic self-interest, 1 6 3 retrospective 
evaluation of incumbent performance, 1M prospective cost-benefit analy-
sis,165 disinterested deliberation on the common good, 166 or some other 
set of criteria-indeed, whether any particular voter or group of voters 
"should" have concluded that showing up at the polls to vote was worth 
the effort in the first place. 167 Yet any normative account of ideal voting 
behavior is likely to be deeply contested. 
161 Schauer, supra note 71, at 382 (the risk of slippage in a slippery slope argument must 
be systematic, not general). 
162 AusTiN RANNEY, THE DocTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT: ITS ORIGIN 
AND PRESENT STATE, ch. 8-9 (1954); American Political Science Association-Committee on 
Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-PartySystem, 44 AM. POL. Sci. REV. Supp. 
(1950). 
163 See Gregory B. Markus, The Impact of Personaland NationalEconomic Conditions 
on the PresidentialVote: A Pooled Cross-SectionalAnalysis, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 137, 151-52 
(1988). 
164 See MORRIS FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
(1981). 
165 See DowNs, supra note 121. 
166 ROBERT E. GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY 79-80 (2003); IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE 
OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 2-3, 21 (2003). 
167 According to Downs, rational voters will not conclude they ought to go to the polls to 
vote unless the expected benefit of doing so, discounted by the probability-under conditions 
of uncertainty-of the benefit materializing, exceeds the costs of doing so. DowNs, supra 
note 121, ch. 3. 
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Second, the slippery slope argument from incumbent entrenchment 
often seems to proceed from the premise that insulating incumbents from 
electoral competition is an all-or-nothing proposition: either electoral 
competition is free and open, or it is not; incumbents are vulnerable to 
displacement, or they are not. Yet this cannot be correct. Actions having 
a tendency to insulate incumbents from electoral competition may pro-
vide incumbents with a greater or lesser benefit, and actions that furnish 
such a benefit may provide it to a greater or lesser number of incum-
bents, who are in a better or worse position to exploit it. As a result, the 
potential impact of incumbent-entrenching actions on the ultimate com-
position of a legislature is better conceived as lying along a spectrum 
ranging from measures that have no discernable impact to those guaran-
teeing effortless reelection for each and every incumbent office holder. 
It is also possible that proponents of the slippery slope argument 
might be making a somewhat different point: they might contend that 
insulating any incumbents from electoral competition to any degree, no 
matter how slight, inflicts such grievous and unacceptable harm to a 
democratic polity that any action having a tendency to produce such a 
result cannot be countenanced. Yet this position similarly exaggerates 
the harm associated with incumbent entrenchment. 
Complete and perfect responsiveness to some idealized version of 
the popular will is a Rousseauvian fantasy168 that cannot be achieved in 
any real-world system of democratic rules and processes. All election 
procedures have consequences for electoral outcomes, and all therefore 
result in slippage from any conceivable standard of ideal results. 169 As 
Benn and Peters pointed out long ago: "The will of the people cannot be 
determined independently of the particular [voting] procedure employed, 
for it is not a natural will, nor is it a sum of similar wills of persons 
sharing common interests, but the result of going through a procedure 
which weighs some wills against others ... ."70 For example, the 
choice of an electoral system itself-proportional representation or first-
past-the-post, plurality winner or runoff, and so on-makes a huge dif-
ference in how the popular will is measured. Following that choice, 
many procedures and practices systematically bias electoral outcomes in 
168 Rousseau famously (or perhaps infamously) invented the concept of the "general will" 
to bring the actual will of individual voters into harmony with what he conceived to be a 
unitary will of the collectivity. JEAN-JACQUEs ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 63-64, 
69-74 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762). To make this conceit work, 
Rousseau was forced to treat the views of electoral minorities as simply mistaken attempts to 
sense the true general will. Id. at 153 ("When, therefore, the opinion contrary to my own 
prevails, this proves only that I have made a mistake, and that what I believed to be the general 
will was not so."). 
169 This assumes once again that ideal results can even be discerned for purposes of mea-
suring deviation therefrom, a significant and doubtful assumption. 
170 S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGT 397 (1959). 
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favor of incumbents or challengers. The imposition of term limits, for 
example, provides an immediate and systematic advantage to challeng-
ers. Incumbents may benefit from procedural choices ranging from the 
use of single-member districts instead of party lists, to allocation of re-
districting decisions to sitting legislatures, to granting of the franking 
privilege. Other kinds of procedural choices may create bias for or 
against incumbents depending upon the specific context: voter qualifica-
tions, the precise days and hours of voting, the ease or difficulty of regis-
tration, and so forth. 
If democratic legitimacy were irrevocably damaged by the kinds of 
slippage that inevitably accompany the construction and occupancy of 
any real electoral system, then all democracies would lack legitimacy. 
We are therefore forced, it seems, to reject a definition of incumbent 
entrenchment so uncompromising that the slightest deviations from a 
perfect embodiment of the popular will are understood to compromise 
democratic values to an intolerable degree. On the contrary, tradeoffs in 
the implementation of democratic ideals are inevitable, and must be tol-
erated to a considerable extent. 17 1 
This conclusion is significant. Because slippery slope arguments 
typically rest on a routine kind of cost-benefit analysis, 172 they may be 
rebutted by better and more plausible accounts of the actual costs and 
benefits of taking or failing to take a proposed action. A slippery slope 
argument may therefore be rebutted by showing that the expected bene-
fits of taking the contested action exceed the expected costs of doing 
S0.173 In the case of campaign spending limits, substituting a more real-
istic account of the harm caused by incumbent entrenchment-one that 
acknowledges that such harm may fall along a spectrum from minimal to 
grave-may change the calculus significantly. 
171 This understanding historically has been reflected in the Supreme Court's longstand-
ing recognition that states require a good deal of latitude in structuring their electoral systems. 
See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) ("[A]s a practical matter, there must be a 
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, 
rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes."); Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 
2819 (2010) ("'States allowing ballot initiatives have considerable leeway to protect the integ-
rity and reliability of the initiative process, as they have with respect to election processes 
generally."' (quoting Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191 
(1999)). 
172 Consistent with cost-benefit analysis, most slippery slope arguments claim that the 
disfavored outcome carries extraordinary costs, and either that its likelihood is high, or that 
even if its likelihood is low, the severity of the associated costs counsel the rational decision-
maker against taking the disputed action. See WALTON, supra note 73, at 260; Enoch, supra 
note 75, at 636; Mayo, supra note 73, at 80; Volokh, supra note 73, at 1039-48. 
173 See WALTON, supra note 73, at 260. 
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4. Attribution of Excessive Agency to a Single Factor 
A final flaw that can weaken slippery slope arguments is the attribu-
tion of excessive agency to one causal factor out of many. 174 Undesir-
able outcomes often result from the complex interactions of many 
influences. The more various and complex the causes of a phenomenon, 
the less causal agency may plausibly be attributed to any one of them. In 
these circumstances, the fact that an action may make the existence of 
one causal condition more likely cannot count as a very strong reason to 
avoid taking the action, and the more numerous and complex the causes 
of the undesirable outcome, the less reason one has to avoid taking an 
action that operates on only one of the relevant causal conditions. 
The slippery slope argument based on incumbent entrenchment 
makes this error by attributing to campaign spending far more signifi-
cance and agency than it typically has, or is capable of having, in the 
exceedingly complex, multi-variable environment of a campaign for 
elective office. In point of fact, the possibility that limiting campaign 
spending will systematically advantage incumbents is speculative, and 
that it will do so decisively and irreversibly, as the slippery slope argu-
ment contends, is speculative to the point of implausibility. 
Too often, partisans on all sides of the lengthy, ongoing debate over 
campaign finance, whether proponents or opponents of reform, seem to 
begin from two shared assumptions: that every race between an incum-
bent and a challenger is presumptively wide open and competitive; and 
that our failure to observe widespread competitive races and substantial 
unseating of incumbents must be attributed to campaign spending. Both 
halves of this equation are false. 
First, wholly apart from their capacity to outspend their rivals, all 
candidates operate under numerous constraints that may in many circum-
stances drastically limit their ability to win election. The primary func-
tion of election campaigns is to mobilize supporters.175 If a candidate 
lacks support in the electorate, spending is useless because there are no 
supporters to mobilize. A Democrat generally has no realistic chance of 
winning an overwhelmingly Republican district, or a liberal in a con-
servative district. Perhaps the best illustration of such constraints is the 
low success rate of self-financed candidates-rich individuals who, with 
no established electoral appeal, parachute into races to take on more es-
177 tablished opponents. 176 Even in potentially competitive races, the 
more challengers spend of their own money the worse they generally 
174 Id. at 76. 
175 GARDNER, supra note 66, at 170-71. 
176 See STEEN, supra note 154, at ch. 1. 
177 I.e. those that take place in districts in which the major parties are competitive over 
time, that do not involve an uncontested race, etc. See STEEN, supra note 154, at 12. 
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perform.178 According to the author of the definitive study of self-fi-
nancing candidates, these results have less to do with spending than with 
the simple fact that self-financing candidates, especially when they are 
challengers rather than incumbents, "tend to be inexperienced, low-qual-
ity candidates."17 9 As a result, "[i]n most cases, even extreme self-fi-
nancing has little effect on who stands in the winner's circle." 8 0 To be 
sure, some rich, self-financing candidates do win their races, but it seems 
safe to conclude that those who do so win more on account of the degree 
to which they appeal to the preexisting preferences of voters than on 
account of their spending.' 8 1 
Second, all slippery slope arguments depend on a firm linkage be-
tween asserted cause and feared effect, but here the connection between 
limiting campaign spending and entrenching incumbents is too specula-
tive to support the argument in any kind of strong form. After decades of 
research, political scientists still cannot agree on whether the outspending 
of rivals by candidates has any significant, systematic impact on electo-
ral outcomes.182 The slippery slope argument at issue here, however, is 
178 See id. at 15-16. 
179 Id. at 122. 
180 Id. 
181 See id. I hasten to add that this data does not by any means show that money is 
irrelevant to the capacity to be elected. It shows only that money is not the only thing; even 
the richest candidate cannot be elected unless voters find him or her appealing. The signal 
advantage of money-and one that makes its role in electoral politics unfair-is that only 
those individuals with access to large amounts of it are in a position to discover and then to test 
their electoral appeal. 
182 Although the empirical research on the relationship between campaign spending and 
electoral outcomes is voluminous and complex, its main contours can be summarized rela-
tively briefly. Early studies produced bizarre and counterintuitive results-for example, that 
spending by incumbents is ineffective but spending by challengers is highly effective. Gary C. 
Jacobson, The Effects of CampaignSpending in HouseElections: New Evidencefor Old Argu-
ments, 72 AM. J. POL. Sci. 334, 356-57 (1978). Some later studies reached opposite conclu-
sions, attributing low levels of electoral competition-and slight, observed increases in 
incumbent reelection rates-to declines in spending by challengers. See, e.g., Alan I. 
Abramowitz, Incumbency, CampaignSpending, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House 
Elections, 53 J. POL. 35, 53 (1991). The inconsistent results produced by many studies 
prompted a period of methodological criticism. See, e.g., Robert S. Erikson & Thomas R. 
Palfrey, Equilibriain Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Evidence, 94 AM. POL. Sc. 
REV. 595, 595 (2000). More recently, Alan Gerber has argued persuasively that one source of 
the difficulty is that incumbents engage in campaign spending strategically, in a way that 
makes their spending depend on many other factors, including the perceived strength of the 
likely challenge in the context of current political conditions, thus greatly complicating efforts 
to isolate the effect of spending in general, and spending by incumbents and challengers in 
particular, on electoral outcomes. Alan S. Gerber, Does Campaign Spending Work?, 47 AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENIST 541 (2004). In sum, notwithstanding a great deal of research, "little can be 
said with certainty regarding the electoral consequences of campaign finance laws." Donald 
A. Gross et al., State CampaignFinanceRegulationsand ElectoralCompetition, 30 AM. POL. 
RESEARCH 143, 143 (2002). Perhaps the only finding that has stood the test of time is that all 
candidate spending is of declining marginal utility-the more one spends the fewer votes one 
picks up with each additional dollar-and that challengers therefore enjoy more "effective" 
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several steps removed even from this contested proposition because it 
relies not on the contention that spending by candidates has a clear and 
decisive effect on electoral outcomes, but on the contention that uncoor-
dinated independent spending by supporters 83 has such an impact. That 
limits on such spending might systematically advantage incumbents is 
far more speculative. 
In the first place, it is highly speculative that, in any given race, a 
big-money opponent of the incumbent will be sitting on the sidelines, 
ready and willing to spend a decisive amount of money but for regulatory 
limitations on campaign expenditures.18 4 Furthermore, it is highly spec-
ulative that uncoordinatedindependent expenditures will have any sig-
nificant effect, and if they do, that the effect will be the one intended by 
the spender. Because independent campaign expenditures are by defini-
tion uncoordinated with a candidate's campaign, it is far from inevitable 
that such spending will turn out to provide useful support and reinforce-
ment of the message the candidate needs to communicate in order to 
win. 185 
spending than incumbents up until the point that they begin to become as well known as the 
incumbent. See Abramowitz, supra note 182, at 37. 
My own view is that no study demonstrates persuasively that spending is capable system-
atically of changing the results of elections. Even studies that purport to demonstrate a rela-
tion between spending and vote shares are consistent with the more modest conclusion that 
spending is effective only in translating latent support in the electorate into actual support at 
the polls, although translating the last bit of latent support into actual support can be quite 
costly. Nothing, however, suggests that spending by incumbents or challengers is effective in 
converting latent opposition into actual support, and that heavy spending is consequently a 
potential vehicle by which challengers might dislodge incumbents who are not already unpop-
ular with voters. 
183 The spending at issue must by definition be uncoordinated because independent ex-
penditures coordinated with the candidate are considered contributions under campaign fi-
nance law, and are thus regulated not by spending limitations, but by contribution limitations. 
See 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(7)(B) (2006). 
184 This is especially the case where corporations are concerned. Apparently corporations 
have generally liked federal restrictions on corporate contributions because it provides them 
with a degree of protection against being shaken down by candidates and incumbent office 
holders trolling for funds. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the Structural 
Method, or How CharlesBlack Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and 
CongressionalTimidity, 92 GEO. L.J. 833, 853 (2004) (analogizing corporate contribution re-
gimes not to bribery of candidates but to extortion of donors); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right To 
Spend, N.Y. TimEs, July 8, 2007, (Magazine), at 11 ("[T]he ban on corporate soft-money 
contributions to political parties has had some success. Candidates are relieved that they do 
not have to help solicit corporate soft money, as they did during the fund-raising scandals of 
the go-go '90s, and corporations are relieved at not being shaken down to contribute to both 
parties to hedge their bets."). 
185 See, e.g., Stephen Engelberg, Bush, His Disavowed Backers anda Very PotentAttack 
Ad, N.Y. TDWES, Nov. 3, 1988, at Al; James O'Toole, Bush, McCain Get Rough, PrTSBURGH 
PosT GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 2000, at Al; William Finn Bennett, Mudslinging Ads Swamp the 50th 
DistrictRace, N. Couwry THWEs (June 4, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.nctimes.com/news/ 
local/govt-and-politics/article_53b2be75-alcc-59e7-ada3-61263eee2f~f.html (all describing 
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In addition, to the extent that uncoordinated independent spending 
does help mobilize voters effectively, it is not clear why the lifting of 
spending restraints would not help incumbents as much as challengers, or 
even more so. There is often more to be gained from spending on behalf 
of an incumbent, thereby cultivating his or her favor, than on behalf of a 
challenger. 18 6 Nor is it clear that unlimited independent spending will 
not frequently cancel itself out. After all, if a race is one in which spend-
ing is even capable of being the decisive consideration, then the race is 
one that is, by hypothesis, capable of being close. This in turn means 
that there is significant exogenous support in the electorate for both the 
incumbent and the challenger, and if we are willing to speculate that 
spending limits would deprive the challenger of the benefits of spending 
by big-money supporters, there is no reason not to make the same as-
sumption on behalf of the incumbent. 
The slippery slope argument goes even further, however; it argues 
not merely that permitting any limitations on campaign spending will 
provide some kind of advantage to incumbents, but that doing so will 
precipitate a slide into a decisive and irreversible entrenchment of incum-
bents so severe as to destroy electoral accountability. This too is implau-
sible. Provided votes are counted accurately and elections are honest, 
there is no defense in a democracy against a sea change in public opin-
ion. Control of Congress and the presidency have changed hands many 
times, in many different electoral conditions.187 One of the best exam-
ples of the limited capacity of incumbents to insure themselves against 
changes in public opinion is the overreaching gerrymander, a tactic that 
Grofman and Brunell evocatively term a "dummymander."' 88 Because 
gerrymandering controls the political inclinations of the relevant electo-
rate directly, by selecting among voters rather than things they might 
situations in which candidates for office felt it necessary to disavow advertisements attacking 
their opponents that had been produced without coordination by third parties). 
186 According to one pre-Citizens United study, "[i]ncumbent federal officeholders cur-
rently enjoy a nearly twenty-to-one advantage over challengers in the receipt of corporate PAC 
contributions. This advantage will only be magnified if corporations are able to reward their 
legislative allies with unlimited spending from corporate coffers." Brief of Center for Political 
Accountability and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at the 
Wharton School as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee on Supplemental Question, Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 611 at **8. 
187 Just recently, for example, Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress in 
1994, and Democrats regained control over both houses in 2006. Clerk of the House of Repre-
sentatives, Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 8, 1994 (May 12, 1995), http:/ 
Iclerk.house.gov/member info/electionlnfo/1994/94Stat.htm; Clerk of the House of Represent-
atives, Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 7, 2006 (Sept. 21, 2007), http:// 
clerk.house.gov/member info/electionlnfo/2006election.pdf. 
188 Bernard Grofman & Thomas L. Brunell, The Art of the Dummymander: The Impactof 
Recent Redistrictingon the PartisanMakeup of Southern House Seats, in REDISTRICTING IN 
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 183 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005). 
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potentially say, it is potentially an effective method of insulating incum-
bents from defeat. Yet there is no complete safety for incumbents even 
in a deliberately gerrymandered district; large-scale changes in public 
political opinion are capable of overwhelming even the most direct at-
tempts at incumbent self-entrenchment.18 9 
The possibility that incumbents might permanently insulate them-
selves from competition by manipulating campaign spending is even 
more attenuated. Unlike gerrymandering, regulation of campaign spend-
ing controls electoral outcomes, if it does so at all, only very indirectly 
by manipulating speech rather than voting predispositions. This kind of 
regulation is simply too blunt an instrument to do the difficult job of 
genuinely entrenching incumbents against electoral competition. Well-
motivated regulation of campaign spending may have unforeseen and un-
intended consequences, to be sure, but it is extravagant to think that in-
cumbents could control this tool with the necessary precision for any 
length of time. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that an absolutist stance against regulation of cam-
paign spending rests on an implicit fear of a slide down a slippery slope 
to a loss of democratic self-rule, but that a close examination of the slip-
pery slope argument reveals it to be too weak and speculative to support 
the Court's rigid, categorical opposition to all campaign spending regula-
tion. Interestingly, however, the same arguments that demonstrate the 
weakness of the Court's anti-regulatory absolutism also tend to cast 
doubt on the urgency that reformers often seem to feel to impose limits 
on campaign spending. The same considerations that make the linkage 
between spending limits and incumbent entrenchment speculative and 
implausible also tend to show the speculativeness of the contention that 
failing to impose spending limitations will inevitably and irrevocably 
hand control of politics to the rich. Just as the regulation of spending is a 
blunt and limited tool for the purpose of manipulating electoral out-
comes, so spending itself is a blunt instrument for the purpose of ensur-
ing electoral success. The truth, therefore, most likely resides 
somewhere in the great middle area between the polar extremes of pro-
regulatory enthusiasm and anti-regulatory absolutism. The stakes, at the 
end of the day, may be lower than either side is willing to concede. 90 
189 Samuel Issacharoff & Jonathan Nagler, Protectedfrom Politics: Diminishing Margins 
of Electoral Competition in US CongressionalElections, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1121, 1121-22 
(2007) ("Even uncompetitive districts are at some level subject to shifts in voter prefer-
ence. . . . [S]o long as there are elections, the voters can always override the designed 
outcomes."). 
190 For further discussion of this point, see GARDNER, supra note 66, at 174-77. 
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In light of these considerations, I believe the Court's campaign 
spending decisions are unnecessarily rigid, but not because spending lim-
its are indispensable to a reasonably responsive, acceptably legitimate 
form of electoral democracy. In my view, spending limitations should be 
upheld for more symbolic reasons. Limitations on campaign spending 
express a society's normative commitments to several very important 
principles: the democratic equality of citizens; separation of the contin-
gency of economic power from the contingency of political power; and 
subordination of economic status to democratic status. The value of a 
society's open expression of commitment to these principles is not to be 
minimized. Moreover, it is at least possible that some of the many bene-
fits to campaign finance regulation that have been identified-political 
equality, better deliberation, and so forth-might actually be realized to 
some extent. Both the risks and potential benefits of campaign finance 
regulation seem, in the American context, remote. In these circum-
stances, the balance is better struck in favor of permitting some good to 
emerge. Thus, in my view, if there are some races in which campaign 
spending limits will promote equality of political influence by leveling a 
tilted playing field to the benefit of challengers, that is enough to justify 
sustaining them. 

